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SEEKING JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONAL 
SOCIETIES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
PROBLEMS AND FAILURES OF THE 
JUDICIARY IN NIGERIA 
Okechukwu Oko* 
ABSTRACT 
The attainment of justice represents one of the enduring promises of 
constitutional democracy. Democracy offers opportunities for citizens to 
reclaim and enjoy the rights and liberties denied them by military dicta-
torships that have dominated Africa’s political landscape for the better 
part of the last century. 
Despite the establishment of constitutional democracy, however, the 
path to justice is strewn with social, cultural and institutional problems 
that make it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to realize 
the promises of justice contained in their country’s constitution. More 
problematic for citizens who seek justice is the fact that judges, driven by 
lust for power and wealth, often align themselves with the rich and the 
powerful in society to frustrate the search for justice. These faithless 
judges defer to and are often controlled by government officials, party 
stalwarts, and influential private citizens who have strong incentives to 
manipulate the judicial process to suit their preferences. The few upright 
judges who have the integrity to resist attempts of undue influence by the 
government and other private citizens are disabled from efficiently dis-
pensing justice by prevailing environmental factors, including inadequate 
facilities, intimidation, and harassment. 
This Article examines the problems that disable the judiciary from ef-
fectively discharging a Nation’s eminently important tasks of fairly and 
impartially adjudicating disputes, protecting citizens’ rights and con-
straining the excesses of both the executive and the legislature. It offers 
suggestions for addressing the problems and inadequacies of the judici-
ary. Ultimately, the Article argues that establishing an efficient judiciary 
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requires the appointment and retention of competent and upright judges 
who will be challenged and encouraged by the proper balance of educa-
tion and disciplinary regimes to remain faithful to the ideals of justice. It 
will also require the political elites to change their attitude toward the 
judiciary. Their commitment to the independence of the judiciary must 
go beyond mere symbolism. The judiciary cannot fairly and efficiently 
dispense justice if political elites continue the charade of masquerading 
as champions of liberty and defenders of judicial independence while 
striving to interfere with, intimidate and manipulate the judiciary. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
he mood of Nigerian society at the end of military dictatorship was 
understandably ecstatic.1 Nigerians based their optimism on the 
premise that democracy offers opportunities, liberties and freedoms uni-
maginable in a dictatorship.2 Citizens hoped that democracy would read-
                                                                                                             
 1. Nigeria returned to constitutional democracy after fifteen years of military inter-
regnum in 1999. See generally Rotimi T. Suberu & Larry Diamond, Institutional Design, 
Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria, in THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
DEMOCRACY 400 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002) (discussing Nigerian political history 
since 1960). Nigeria has been ruled by brutal, repressive and often visionless military 
despots for all but fourteen years of its forty-four years as an independent nation. Id. 
 2. The enjoyment of these rights and privileges distinguishes a democracy from 
dictatorial and tyrannical regimes. See Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Human Rights 
Under Different Conditions of Development, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERSPECTIVE: A 
GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 235, 235 (Asbjørn Eide & Bernt Hagtvet eds., 1992). Justice  
Olajide Ola-tawura, retired Supreme Court Justice and former Administrator of the Na-
tional Judicial Institute, described the state of the law and the attitude of the government 
to civil rights under the military: 
During the Military regime the law became weak as a result of ouster clauses 
and suspensions of our Constitution and existing laws which gave us liberty 
and freedom. The Constitutional duty to protect the liberty and freedom of the 
citizens by the state was regularly breached by those entrusted with that sacred 
duty . . . . The rights of citizens were not only ignored but trampled on. 
J. Olajide Olatawura, Administrator, National Judicial Institute, Welcome Address at 
1999 All Nigeria Judges’ Conference (Nov. 1, 1999), in NAT’L JUD. INST., 1999 ALL 
NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE xxv (2000).  General Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria’s cur-
rent President, in a welcome address to the Seminar on Corruption, Democracy and Hu-
man Rights in East and Central Africa, organized by the Africa Leadership Forum in 
Entebbe, Uganda, eloquently captured African peoples’ desire for democratic govern-
ment: 
The clamour today for democracy and good governance in Africa stems from 
two broad reasons. First, the denial of fundamental human rights, the presence 
of arbitrariness and the absence of basic freedoms for the individual have in the 
main remained familiar traits of a majority of governments in Africa. The strain 
of these styles of governance has prompted a demand and a clamour for new 
approaches to the resolution of various national questions. In consequence, Af-
ricans are clamouring for greater responsiveness on the part of their political 
leadership, respect for human rights, accountability and a two way flow of in-
formation between the people and their leadership. They are also clamouring 
for an adequate legal system and for the laws and the independence of the Judi-
ciary and a free press, which together can serve as a bulwark against the op-
pression of government, and especially a corrupt or unpopular government. 
T 
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ily translate into respect for rights and liberties3 and that they would be 
able to seek justice unburdened by the restraints and limitations imposed 
by military dictators.4 
The right to a fair trial is perhaps the most fundamental tenet of consti-
tutional democracy5 and has been recognized as a universal human right.6 
It is central to a Nation’s search for social equilibrium and justice be-
cause all of the rights guaranteed by a constitution mean nothing if citi-
zens do not have the right to a fair trial.7 Without securing the right to a 
fair trial, citizens might resort to extra legal means to secure their inter-
ests and protect their rights.8 Moreover, economic growth and social de-
velopment will be impeded if foreign and local investors lack confidence 
                                                                                                             
Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, Chairman, Africa Leadership Forum, Welcome Address at the 
Seminar: Corruption, Democracy and Human Rights in East and Central Africa (Dec. 12, 
1994), quoted in Justice Amina Augie, Human Rights and Good Governance in Africa: A 
Critical Nexus Expanding Human Rights (Oct. 11–15, 2004), http://www.uneca.org/adf/ 
documents/speeches_and_presentations/amina.htm. 
 3. Citizens who endured tremendous hardship and brutality under the military are 
demanding respect for their rights and liberties with relentless vigor. See, e.g., Joseph 
Ogunsemi & Sulaymon Abdulkareem, Mass Rally, Rights and Limits of Rights, DAILY 
TIMES (Nig.), May 3, 2004, 2004 WLNR 6927224. The Chief Justice of Nigeria, Mo-
hammed Uwais, expressed the view widely held by Nigerians: “Nigerians now agree that 
democracy is the best form of government and that real democracy will offer a ready 
solution to all the political and social ills of the country.”  Chief Justice M.L. Uwais, 
Address to the All Nigeria Judges’ Conference (Nov. 5–9, 2001), in NAT’L JUD. INST., 
ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 2001 at xxix, xxx (2003). 
 4. Military rulers enacted several laws as well as regulations and practices that se-
verely curtailed civil rights and liberties. Okechukwu Oko, Lawyers in Chains: Restric-
tions on Human Rights Advocacy Under Nigeria’s Military Regimes, 10 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 257 (1997); see generally B.O. NWABUEZE, MILITARY RULE AND CONSTITU-
TIONALISM IN NIGERIA (1992). 
 5. The right to a fair trial has been described as “the most fundamental of all free-
doms.”  Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). In England, the right to a fair trial has 
always been viewed as a vital element of the justice system. As one English court stated, 
“the right to a fair trial . . . is as near to an absolute right as any which I can envisage.” 
Regina v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham, (1997) Q.B. 575, 585. 
 6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone is entitled in full equal-
ity to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal.”). 
 7. See Dahl, supra note 2, at 235 (arguing that in order for a country to be classified 
as a democracy certain rights must realistically exist). 
 8. Justice Oyeyipo, Chief Judge of Kwara State, observed that, “the administration 
of justice is at the core of any successful democracy in the world. If the Legal profession 
fails, anarchy will be the only beneficiary.”  Chief Judge T.A. Oyeyipo, Professional Mis-
conduct: Problems and Solutions, Paper presented at the 2003 Annual General Confer-
ence of the Nigerian Bar Association 20 (Aug. 24–29, 2003). 
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in the ability of the legal process to fairly and impartially resolve dis-
putes.9 
The Nigerian Constitution and other laws10 contain substantive and 
procedural safeguards designed to assure a fair trial.11 These safeguards 
cover all stages of judicial proceedings, from pre-trial through appeal.12 
Some of the pre-trial safeguards include prohibitions against arbitrary 
arrest,13 the right to be brought before a judge within a reasonable time 
                                                                                                             
 9. Osita Okoro, The Judiciary and the New Development Agenda, THIS DAY (Nig.), 
Dec. 23, 2003, 2003 WLNR 7736033 (discussing the impediment to economic develop-
ment caused by a troubled judiciary). Professor Fidelis Oditah, a visiting Professor of 
Law at Oxford University stated, “If foreign and domestic investors lose faith in the abil-
ity of our law and the judicial system to protect their investments and property rights or to 
adjudicate disputes in a timely and fair manner without undue or improper influences, 
they will be reluctant to invest.”  Chika Amanze-Nwachuku, How Justice System Affects 
Foreign Investment, THIS DAY (Nig.), May 7, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7185777. Alassane D. 
Quatarra stated that, “[t]he perceived risk of investment [in Africa] is reduced by . . . 
legal reforms to simplify commercial jurisprudence and improve the functioning of 
courts, enforce contracts fairly and impartially, and protect property rights . . . .”  Alas-
sane D. Ouattara, former IMF Deputy Managing Dir., to a Meeting of the Africa Studies 
Program of the Council on Foreign Relations, Fostering Trade and Investment—A Vehi-
cle to Accelerating Africa’s Integration into the Global Economy (Mar. 25, 1999), http:// 
www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/1999/032599.htm. 
 10. See, e.g., Criminal Procedure Act, (1990) Cap. 80, § 287 (Nigeria). 
 11. Specifically, the Constitution provides: 
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations, including any question 
or determination by or against any government or authority, a person shall be 
entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal 
established by law and constituted in such a manner as to secure its independ-
ence and impartiality. 
CONSTITUTION, art. 36 (1999) (Nigeria). For a general discussion of the concept of fair 
hearing in Nigeria, see Akin Olujinmi, Fair Hearing in Nigeria: The Current State of the 
Law, in ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NIGERIA: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HON. JUSTICE 
MOHAMMED LAWAL UNIS, CON, GCON, THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF NIGERIA 1 (John Ademola 
Yakubu ed., 2000). 
 12. Fair trial rights do not necessarily begin and end with court proceedings. They 
attach whenever the legal process is set in motion. For example, in criminal trials, fair 
trial rights start with arrest, and continue until the final disposition of the case either at 
the court of first instance or by courts of appeal. See Criminal Procedure Act, (1990) Cap. 
80 (Nigeria); Oluyemisi Bamgbose, Women’s Rights and the Nigerian Criminal Justice 
System: A Sorry Tale, Paper presented at the 7th International Interdisciplinary Congress 
on Women, Tromsø, Norway (June 20–26, 1999), http://www.skk.uit.no/WW99/papers/ 
Bamgbose_Oluyemisi.pdf. 
 13. Before arresting a person, the police must adhere to a minimal set of procedural 
standards. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 33–36 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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and a prohibition against ex post facto laws.14 The safeguards applicable 
during trials include the presumption of innocence,15 the right to confront 
and cross-examine witnesses,16 proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt,17 protection against self-incrimination,18 the right to counsel,19 the 
right to a public trial before an impartial and independent court20 and the 
suppression of illegally obtained evidence.21 Post-trial safeguards grant 
an aggrieved party the right of appeal to a higher court22 and protection 
against double jeopardy.23 Despite these lofty safeguards, the path to jus-
tice is strewn with social, cultural and institutional problems that make it 
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for citizens to realize the ideals 
of a fair trial.24 In Nigeria, the troubling legacies of military rule, espe-
cially corruption, executive control and manipulation of the judiciary, 
continue to undermine the ability of courts to effectively secure fair trial 
rights.25 These legacies create three major obstacles to a fair trial in Nige-
ria. 
                                                                                                             
 14. CONSTITUTION, art. 36(8) (1999) (Nigeria). 
 15. The Constitution provides, “Every person who is charged with a criminal offence 
shall be presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty.”  Id. art. 36(5). 
 16. Id. art. 36(6)(d). 
 17. Section 138(1) of the Evidence Act provides that “if the commission of a crime by 
a party to any proceeding is directly in issue in any proceeding civil or criminal, it must 
be proved beyond reasonable doubt.”  Evidence Act, (1990) Cap. 112, § 138(1) (Nigeria). 
 18. CONSTITUTION, art. 36(11) (1999) (Nigeria). 
 19. Id. art. 36(6)(c). 
 20. Id. art. 36(1), (3). 
 21. For example, confessions obtained by inducement, threat or promise are generally 
excluded. See Evidence Act, (1990) Cap. 112, § 28 (Nigeria). 
 22. The Constitution established a Court of Appeal as an intermediate court between 
the high court and the Supreme Court. In its appellate role, it ensures a fair trial by cor-
recting errors of courts and tribunals below it. CONSTITUTION, arts. 237, 240 (1999) (Ni-
geria). 
 23. Id. art. 36(9). 
 24. Professor Adedokun Adeyemi identifies the following as the major obstacles to 
the administration of justice: inadequate funding for judicial institutions; poor and inade-
quate physical facilities; shortage of and obsoletism in equipment; shortage of and inade-
quate utilization of staff; inadequate or total lack of training; poor conditions of service; 
delay and congestion in courts; dishonest practices and corruption; culturally incompati-
ble laws and procedures and lack of adequate information systems. Adedokun A. Ad-
eyemi, The Challenges of Administration of Justice in Nigeria For The Twenty-First 
Century, in PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JUSTICE EZE 
OZOBU 195, 196–204 (I.A Umezulike & C.C. Nweze eds., 1996). 
 25. Late dictator Abacha’s scathing indictment of the judiciary fairly reflected pre-
vailing public sentiments about the judiciary. He stated while inaugurating a panel to 
investigate the judiciary: 
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The first, and by far the most debilitating, is corruption. Honest and 
impartial decision making, so vital to the credibility and effectiveness of 
the judiciary, is palpably absent in Nigeria.26 The judiciary, which should 
“exemplify the nation’s best and most just virtues,”27 now reflects the 
worst aspects of moral decadence in Nigeria. Some judges have suc-
cumbed to the despicable belief that amassing wealth matters more than 
anything else, including honor and integrity.28 These dishonest judges 
subordinate their commitment to justice to the desire to amass wealth. 
Anyone who can pay or influence a judge’s judicial career can dictate the 
                                                                                                             
The political crises which necessitated the re-entry of the Military do not ab-
solve the Nigerian Judiciary. In the public eye, the Judiciary was neck-deep in 
the cross-current which sounded the death knell of the emerging Third Repub-
lic. The perception was unmistakable that the Judiciary do not [sic] rise above 
the conflicting partisan conflict, the Judiciary seemed to have embarked on an 
odyssey of self-ridicule which abridged its integrity and cast aspersion on its 
credibility. 
Philip Nnaemeka-Agu, Retired Justice, Supreme Court of Nigeria, The Role of the Na-
tional Judicial Council in the Administration of Justice Under the 1999 Constitution, 
Paper presented to All Nigeria Judges’ Conference 6 (Dec. 8–13, 2003) (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 26. The Nigerian judiciary that admirably discharged its duties during the early post-
independence years now shows signs of weakness, inadequacy and corruption. Because 
of the mutual benefits of corruption, the corrupt judge and the bribe giver have no interest 
in reporting the crime. Corruption only gets to the surface when one of the parties feels 
cheated or chooses to display an uncommon sense of duty and comes forward to report 
on corruption. It is therefore difficult to estimate the actual extent of judicial corruption. 
My familiarity with the Nigerian scene, discussions with my colleagues, and newspaper 
accounts all indicate that judicial corruption is endemic and pervasive. 
 27. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Racism in American and South African Courts: Simi-
larities and Differences, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 479, 483 (1990). 
 28. Dr. Maduagwu attributes the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria to the prevailing 
culture that condones and even encourages corruption: 
Corruption thrives in Nigeria because the society sanctions it. No Nigerian offi-
cial would be ashamed, let alone condemned by his people, because he or she is 
accused of being corrupt. The same applies to outright stealing of government 
or public money or property. On the contrary, the official will be hailed as be-
ing smart. He would be adored as having ‘made it’; he is ‘a successful man’. 
And any government official or politician who is in a position to enrich himself 
corruptly but failed to do so will, in fact, be ostracised by his people upon leav-
ing office. He would be regarded as a fool, or selfish, or both. 
M.O. Maduagwu, Nigeria in Search of Political Culture: The Political Class, Corruption 
and Democratization, in CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN NIGERIA 13, 18–19 
(Alex Gboyega ed., 1996). 
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court’s decision.29 Trials often turn into charades where powerful liti-
gants, aided by unethical lawyers and faithless judges, manipulate the 
judicial process to achieve preordained outcomes.30 Citizens, lawyers and 
even eminent jurists now openly acknowledge that the judicial system is 
no longer a realistic forum for obtaining justice, especially for citizens 
who lack the resources and social connections to influence the outcome 
of judicial proceedings.31 
                                                                                                             
 29. In a system festooned with corruption, justice is often determined by the depth of 
a party’s willingness to take advantage of his or her status in the society. A corrupt judge 
is driven by the desire to amass wealth and is willing to bend the law to accommodate 
complaining parties who grease his palm. Nigerian Supreme Court Justice Niki Tobi 
aptly described the mindset and modus operandi of a corrupt judge: 
[A] judge who is corrupt is the greatest enemy of the judicial process. A corrupt 
judge is blind to the truth. He is incapable of searching for the truth in the judi-
cial process. His mind is diseased and he is incapable of doing justice in the 
matter before him. He likes the party who has given him the bribe. He hates the 
party who has not given him the bribe. He therefore, gives judgment to the 
party he likes and gives judgment against the party he hates. 
Niki Tobi, Code of Conduct and Professional Ethics for Judicial Officers in Nigeria, in 
JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HON. JUSTICE ANTHONY I. IGUH 37, 82–83 
(J. O. Irukwu & I. A. Umezulike eds., 2004). 
 30. Alhaji Nahu Ribadu, the Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Com-
mission, a body charged with investigating and prosecuting economic and financial 
crimes in Nigeria, recently directed his ire at judges and lawyers who help the rich to 
escape accountability. He stated: 
[A]ny time we commence full prosecution, lawyers to these 419 kingpins will 
use the court to stall prosecution . . . . It is only the poor that go to prison. It is 
high time we brought the rich who are criminals to justice. They have money 
and use their money to buy their way out. Today, there is no rich man in Nige-
rian prisons. 
Josephine Lohor & Victor Efeizomor, 419: Judiciary Used to Frustrate Trial, Says Riba-
du, THIS DAY (Nig.), Oct. 29, 2003. 
 31. Several organizations, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and 
the U.S. State Department have documented problems of fair trial rights in Nigeria. The 
U.S. State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2003 found: 
[T]he judicial branch remained susceptible to executive and legislative branch 
pressure . . . . The judiciary was influenced by political leaders particularly at 
the state and local levels. Understaffing, underfunding, inefficiency, and cor-
ruption continued to prevent the judiciary from functioning adequately. Citi-
zens encountered long delays and frequent requests from judicial officials for 
small bribes to expedite cases. 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, NIGERIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2003); 
FREEDOM HOUSE, Nigeria, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2004: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
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While corruption is the first major obstacle to a fair trial, the second is 
the attitude of the government toward the judiciary.32 Hubristic politi-
cians who cavil at the notion of judicial independence continue to display 
the capacity and the inclination to manipulate and control the judiciary.33 
Most politicians are neither committed to the establishment of a strong, 
virile and independent judiciary, nor do they believe that the judiciary 
should have the power to review legislative and executive decisions.34 
Some elected officials have a distorted view of the judiciary as an exten-
                                                                                                             
POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 415, 417 (2004), available at http://www. 
freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/Nigeria.htm (“The judiciary is 
subject to political interference and is hampered by corruption and inefficiency.”). 
 32. The judiciary in post-independent states has had a troubled relationship with the 
government. See, e.g., Comment, The Judiciary: The Pain of Transition, SUNDAY 
MIRROR (Zimb.), July 23, 2002. African governments, whether military or civilian, have 
been ambivalent toward the judiciary. They need the judiciary to act as a stabilizing force 
in enforcing law and order and yet at the same time resent the judiciary for checking ex-
ecutive excesses. See, e.g., Philip Ogunmade, Democracy: Rule of Law Still a Mirage, 
THIS DAY (Nig.), Aug. 25, 2005, 2005 WLNR 13465952. Ghanaian Professor Amissah’s 
characterization of the relationship between the government and the judiciary in most 
African states is still relevant today: 
It would seem that on the whole governments in the newly independent coun-
tries hanker after the simplicity of the colonial arrangement, with the primary 
aim of the courts being to uphold the power of the state, enforce its laws and 
provide stability. The courts’ function of protection of the individual from the 
abuse of power is relatively new and less well appreciated . . . . In any event 
until the people develop values to guide their court, other than that of upholding 
state power, the constitutional enactment of the separation of powers is bound 
to remain largely a declaration of intent. 
A.N.E. Amissah, The Role of the Judiciary in the Governmental Process: Ghana’s Ex-
perience, 13 AFR. L. STUD. 4, 21 (1976). 
 33. See infra Part II.C. 
 34. CENT. AND EAST EUR. LAW INITIATIVE (CEELI), JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: A 
CONCEPT PAPER (1999). This attitude is not unique to Nigeria. The concept of judicial 
independence is often a controversial issue in most democracies. See generally JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM AROUND THE 
WORLD (Peter Russell & David O’Brien eds., 1999); for an examination of judicial inde-
pendence in England, see Robert Stevens, The Independence of the Judiciary: The Case 
of England, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 597 (1999); for a discussion of the concept of judicial 
independence in South Africa, see J. Nnamdi Aduba, Independence of the Judiciary un-
der the 1999 Constitution: A Critique, in JUSTICE IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: ESSAYS IN 
HONOR OF JUSTICE EUGENE UBAEZONU 390 (C.C. Nweze ed., 2002); Lovemore Madhuku, 
Constitutional Protection of the Independence of the Judiciary: A Survey of the Position 
in South Africa, 46 J. AFR. L. 232 (2002). 
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sion of the executive branch of government.35 This mindset encourages 
attempts to control and manipulate the judiciary and to turn judges into 
“pliable instruments of state power.”36 The pervasive influence of the 
executive, its powers of retaliation and ability to advance or hamper a 
judge’s career37 make it difficult for judges to adjudicate disputes with-
out fear or favor as required by their oath.38 Judges concerned about their 
careers and even their personal safety “temper justice with self preserva-
tion.”39 
The third impediment to a fair trial right is the attitude of the public 
toward the judiciary.40 In Nigeria, there exists a perceptible popular dis-
trust of the judiciary’s integrity and its ability to protect civil rights and 
constrain the excesses of elected officials.41 For most Nigerians, the judi-
cial process is nothing more than an auction in which justice goes to the 
highest bidder.42 Convinced that judges decide cases on the basis of con-
                                                                                                             
 35. CEELI, supra note 34, at § II.H (“In many countries undergoing legal reform, a 
legacy of subordination of the judiciary to state interests and to the party apparatus, and 
exploitation of the judiciary by the state as an official device to validate prerogatives, 
continues to cloud how judges and court systems are perceived.”). 
 36. Okechukwu Oko, Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Chal-
lenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 573, 637 (2000). The idea of 
using the judiciary as a tool of the government, developed during the military rule, is still 
deeply embedded in the culture of politicians. Id. 
 37. See Madhuku, supra note 34, at 234. 
 38. Upon appointment, a judicial oath is administered, wherein the new judge swears 
inter alia to “discharge his duties, and perform his functions honestly, to the best of his 
ability . . . and not allow his personal interest to influence his official conduct . . . or deci-
sions.”  CONSTITUTION, 7th sched. (1999) (Nigeria). 
 39. Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
535, 540 (1999). 
 40. President Obasanjo correctly captured the public disdain for the judiciary in an 
address to the 1999 All Nigeria Judges’ Conference: “[T]here is prevailing disenchant-
ment of the populace with the judiciary—an attitude which has arisen out of the lapses or 
failings of the judiciary.”  Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, President, Nigeria, Address at 1999 
All Nigeria Judges’ Conference (Nov. 1, 1999), in 1999 ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ 
CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at xxxviii. 
 41. President Obasanjo, in a paper delivered at Berlin to mark the 10th Anniversary 
Celebration of Transparency International, correctly identified the public attitude towards 
the judiciary. He stated, “[T]he persisting perception of the public is that it is still battling 
with the widespread corruption that made prosecution and the judicial process less than 
effective under the military.”  Olusegun Obasanjo, President, Republic of Nigeria, Nige-
ria: From Pond of Corruption to Island of Integrity, Address at the 10th Anniversary 
Celebration of Transparency International, Berlin 7 (Nov. 7, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.dawodu.com/obas35.htm). 
 42. A. J. Owonikoko, Law and Human Rights: Tackling Corruption in the Admini-
stration of Justice, VANGUARD (Nig.), Apr. 3, 2003, available at Westlaw: Africa News 
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nections and gratification without regard to the legal merits of the case, 
citizens seek to influence the outcome of cases either by “settling the 
judge,”43 or intimidating judicial officers.44 Far worse, negative percep-
tions about the justice system encourage citizens to resort to violent, ex-
tralegal and possibly criminal practices to secure their rights.45 Popular 
distrust of the judiciary has fueled needless attacks on the integrity and 
the institution of the judiciary.46 
Rights guaranteed by the constitution mean nothing unless they are en-
forced by fair, impartial, independent and good judges.47 The Nigerian 
                                                                                                             
database (“Such perception makes the average Nigerian believe that the judiciary is cor-
rupt, and so they expect that corruption is part of the pricing component of our justice 
system.”). 
 43. Settlement is a euphemism for bribery. In most parts of the country, for example, 
citizens do not have faith in the justice system and are less inclined to resolve conflicts 
through the courts. Those who go to court feel the need to engage in corrupt practices like 
bribery or intimidation to level the playing field. See generally Francis A. Okongwu, 
Nigeria’s Judiciary Requires Sanitation, DAILY CHAMPION (Nig.), July 13, 2004, avail-
able at Westlaw: Africa News database. 
 44. See infra Part II.B. 
 45. Mary Ellen Keith, Judicial Discipline: Drawing the Line Between Confidentiality 
and Public Information, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1399  (2000) (“Lack of confidence in 
the judiciary can grow into a critical mass meltdown, shifting societal stability into anar-
chy.”). 
 46. See, for example, a concerned layman’s appreciation of the problems of justice in 
Nigeria as stated by Francis Okongwu, a Lagos-based pharmacist: 
[T]he judiciary allowed itself to be adulterated by the politics of past military 
democracy with the mentality of settlement, corruption, nepotism, man-know-
man, and thus lost the freedom to dispense justice. Today justice is so expen-
sive beyond the reach of the common man. In fact, it is a cash and carry affair. 
Interlocutory injunctions are issued with reckless abandon, black market 
judgements dispensed with ease, kangaroo courts sit and deliver kangaroo 
judgements, even at night. The Judiciary has lost the will power to resist pres-
sure from [the] political class . . . . 
Okongwu, supra note 43. 
 47. I adopt retired Nigerian Supreme Court Justice Nnaemeka-Agu’s definition of a 
good judge: 
“[A] judge” means “a good, Judge”, that is a Judge who, by good general and 
professional education, experience and expertise exhibits on continuing bases, a 
sound exposition of the law; who has such a high index of good character that 
he is capable of, and seen as, resolving the issues in controversy coming before 
him with absolute sense of justice—impartially and uninfluenced by bias or 
prejudice or any extraneous considerations. 
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judiciary must be fundamentally reformed both to better protect citizens’ 
rights and to preserve itself against institutional contempt in the eyes of 
an increasingly cynical Nigerian public. Public contempt for the justice 
system can be overcome only by providing fair and efficient machinery 
for the administration of justice.48 A fair, efficient and accessible judicial 
system is necessary not just to protect citizens’ rights but also to consoli-
date and deepen the democratic process.49 The judiciary must therefore 
be staffed by competent and honest judges who have the resources and 
sufficient independence to carry out the Nation’s important tasks of ad-
judicating disputes, protecting legal rights, and reviewing executive and 
legislative decisions.50 
This paper examines the institutional and personal problems that dis-
able the judiciary from meaningfully assisting citizens to secure the right 
                                                                                                             
P. Nnaemeka-Agu, The Position and Role of A Judge in A Democratic State, in JUSTICE 
IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 34, at 230. 
 48. The Attorney General of the Federation, Chief Akinlolu Olujinmi, SAN, under-
scored the relationship between justice and democracy: 
Justice is the ligament, which holds civilized society together. Any threat to the 
administration of justice is a threat to the corporate existence of the society. 
The essence of democracy is justice. Every democracy ought therefore to strive 
to provide access to justice for all and protect the rights of the citizenry. The 
destiny of our country lies in making the system of justice work smoothly and 
efficiently. 
Akinlolu Olujinmi, Agenda for Justice Sector Reform, THIS DAY (Nig.), June 8, 2004, 
http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2003/08/26/20030826law07.html. 
 49. See E.O. Ayoola, The Importance of the Rule of Law in Sustaining Democracy 
and Ensuring Good Governance, in ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 2001, supra note 
3, at 47, 58. Justice Ayoola, retired Justice of the Nigerian Supreme Court, succinctly 
described the values of a well-functioning judiciary to the democratic process: 
Fundamental to strengthening the cause of democracy and good governance is 
an efficient judicial system. Democracy will be a sham; (i) if the implication of 
the fundamental principles indicated in the constitution cannot readily be de-
termined in the contemporary or practical of constitutional adjudication; (ii) if 
the power of judicial review of exercise of powers cannot readily be invoked 
either because of the inherent weakness of the system or because of the proce-
dural obstacles to access of justice; or (iii) if there is widespread societal dis-
trust of the judicial process because of delay, inefficiency of the process, lack 
of transparency of the operators of the system and other like reasons. 
Id. 
 50. See CONSTITUTION, art. 6 (1999) (Nigeria). 
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to a fair trial.51 This paper is divided into two parts. Part II examines the 
problems that disable the judiciary from fairly and efficiently dispensing 
justice. These problems require urgent attention and include judicial cor-
ruption, intimidation and manipulation of judges, delays, and inadequate 
infrastructure.52 Part III examines the changes necessary to make the ju-
diciary virile, efficient and independent. It demonstrates that the culture 
and conditions that make the judiciary efficient, namely judicial inde-
pendence, honesty and public confidence,53 are at best extremely tenu-
ous.54 To give meaning to the constitutional requirements of a fair trial 
and regain public confidence in the justice system, Nigeria must cultivate 
and entrench the practices that undergird public confidence in the judici-
ary.55 The problems with the judiciary are systemic, deeply rooted and 
                                                                                                             
 51. In writing this paper, I have drawn on my background and experience as a law 
teacher, a practicing lawyer in Nigeria and as a human rights activist on the front lines of 
the struggle for justice in Nigeria. 
 52. See Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, The State of Law and Legal Practice in Nigeria 2, 
VANGUARD (Nig.), Sept. 19, 2003, available at Westlaw: Africa News database. 
 53. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 53 (2002) (stating that while the preconditions that 
must exist in a legal system to realize the proper judicial role vary from system to system, 
independence of the judiciary, judicial objectivity, and public confidence in the judiciary 
are among the preconditions common to all democratic systems of law). 
 54. Joseph Otteh, Executive Director of Access to Justice, a non-governmental or-
ganization, stated: 
We understand that for meaningful reform to take place, the judiciary needed a 
full turn around maintenance. As it were, at the time of transition from military 
rule, every independent report on the Nigerian judiciary spoke eloquently and 
uniformly of the inundating prevalence within the justice system of corruption, 
unethical and unprofessional behavior, mediocrity, nepotism, incompetence, 
abuse of office, perversion of justice and a host of other weaknesses that clearly 
eroded the moral authority and functional integrity of Nigeria’s justice delivery 
system. 
Andrew Ahiante, Government Urged to Reform Judiciary, THIS DAY (Nig.), Nov. 7, 
2003. 
 55. The meaning of public confidence in the justice system was eloquently described 
by Chief Justice Murray Gleeson of Australia: 
Confidence in the judiciary does not require a belief that all judicial decisions 
are wise, or all judicial behavior impeccable, any more than confidence in rep-
resentative democracy requires a belief that all politicians are enlightened and 
concerned for the public welfare. What it requires, however, is a satisfaction 
that the justice system is based upon values of independence, impartiality, in-
tegrity, and professionalism and that, within the limits of ordinary human 
frailty, the system pursues those values faithfully. 
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intertwined; cosmetic and superficial changes will not work.56 There 
must be a wholesale restructuring of the justice system to cleanse the 
judiciary of corruption and free the judiciary from the overweening grip 
of the executive and other powerful Nigerians.57 Secondly, I argue that 
constitutional provisions designed to guarantee judicial independence are 
                                                                                                             
Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of Australia, Public Confidence in the Judiciary, Judicial 
Conference of Australia, Launceston (Apr. 27, 2002) (transcript available at http://www. 
hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_ica.htm). 
 56. The African Governors of the World Bank urged African countries to embark 
upon a comprehensive reform of their legal system, noting: 
It is clear that “piecemeal” reform of the legal system often does not yield the 
desired result. When an entire legal system has broken down, it is not enough to 
reform only a limited area of the law, such as banking laws, for example, with-
out confronting the weaknesses in law enforcement in general. Modern banking 
laws are of little use when the lawyers, courts, and other legal institutions re-
sponsible for implementing them lack the capacity to do so effectively. What is 
required is a broader strategy of reform which addresses the legal system as a 
whole. 
Douglas Webb, Legal and Institutional Reform Strategy and Implementation: A World 
Bank Perspective, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 161, 161–62 (1999). 
 57. See, e.g., Thompson Ayodele, Right is Might or Might is Right, IPPA NIGERIA 
NEWSLETTER (Inst. of Pub. Policy Analysis, Lagos, Nig.), Jan. 27–Feb. 10, 2004. The 
ultimate goal should be to meet the standards of judicial independence stated by the In-
ternational Bar Association: 
(a) Individual judges should enjoy personal independence and substantive in-
dependence. 
(b) Personal independence means that the terms and conditions of judicial 
service are adequately secured so as to ensure that individual judges are 
not subject to executive control. 
(c) Substantive independence means that in the discharge of his/her judicial 
function a judge is subject to nothing but the law and the commands of 
his/her conscience. 
IBA MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE § A(1) (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1982), 
reprinted in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 388 (Shetreet & 
Deschênes eds., 1985). The First Federal Integrity Meeting for Chief Judges, held by 
Chief Justice of Nigeria and UNODC in 2001, recommended that judicial reform efforts 
focus primarily on: (1) access to justice, (2) timeliness and quality of justice, including 
strengthening coordination and cooperation across the criminal justice system, (3) public 
trust, and (4) the effectiveness and credibility of the complaints system. U.N. Office on 
Drugs and Crime [UNODC], Global Programme Against Corruption, Assessment of Jus-
tice System Integrity and Capacity in Three Nigerian States § V.D. (May 2004), available 
at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/corruption/corruption_nigeria_justice_sector_assess-
ment_2004-05.pdf. 
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in and of themselves ultimately inadequate to ensure both personal and 
institutional independence of the judiciary.58 More needs to be done to 
shield and protect judges from the imperious grip of politicians and 
elected officials.59 
These necessary changes will help secure the right to a fair trial and 
bolster public confidence in the justice system.60 They will also give new 
hope to citizens who have become despondent and hence corrupt because 
of the failures of the judiciary.61 The appropriate reform measures may 
also help the judiciary to regain its prestige and ultimately build a strong 
foundation for the rule of law.62 
                                                                                                             
 58. M.A. Ikhariale, The Independence of the Judiciary Under the Third Republican 
Constitution of Nigeria, 34 J. AFR. L. 145, 147 (1990) (“[E]ven with the tight constitu-
tional guarantee given the judiciary the political arm of the government still occasionally 
manages to exercise influence . . . making it doubtful if indeed Nigeria really possesses a 
constitutional system that ensures the insulation and independence of the judiciary from 
negative manipulation . . . .”). 
 59. See Berry F.C. Hsu, Judicial Independence Under the Basic Law, 34 H.K. L.J. 
279, 282 (2004) (arguing that the judiciary should be given power to sustain its own exis-
tence and repel interference from other branches of government). 
 60. The effectiveness of the judiciary depends to a large extent on the public’s confi-
dence in the ability of judges to fairly and impartially administer justice.  See Alex B. 
Long, “Stop Me Before I Vote For This Judge Again”: Judicial Conduct Organizations, 
Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 8–
9 (2003) (“The continued vitality of the judiciary depends in no small measure on the 
public’s confidence that judges are ethical and that justice is being dispensed fairly and 
impartially.”); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on 
sustained public confidence in its moral sanction.”). 
 61. T. Leigh Anenson, For Whom the Bell Tolls . . . Judicial Selection by Election in 
Latin America, 4 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 261, 262 (1997) (arguing that a well-functioning 
and honest judiciary will not only reinforce the rule of law, but will become the very 
centerpiece for democracy). 
 62. Swithin Munyantwali, the Executive Director, International Law Institute Uganda 
stated: 
A country may have the best roads, hospitals, a high level of environmental 
awareness and implementation of related policies as well as the best utilities 
network. If her judges are dishonest, court registries clogged with cases with no 
ADR mechanisms or commercial courts; if her lawyers are unethical and the 
Bench and the Bar are not up-to-date with the latest legal developments; if her 
private sector is driven by out-dated commercial laws, there will be no rule of 
law. 
SWITHIN J. MUNYANTWALI, THE ROLE OF LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM IN PROMOTING 
THE RULE OF LAW AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 9 (2003). 
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II. PROBLEMS OF THE JUDICIARY 
A. Judicial Corruption 
Nigeria is by all accounts a corrupt country.63 Recent surveys of na-
tions by Transparency International, a Berlin-based nonprofit organiza-
tion, rank Nigeria among the most corrupt countries in the world.64 The 
alarming levels of corruption in Nigerian society apparently moved the 
framers of the 1999 Constitution to declare that “the state shall abolish 
all corrupt practices and abuse of office.”65 Unfortunately, the numerous 
incidents of corruption are not restricted to politicians and government 
officials, but extend to the judiciary as well.66 Nigerian judges and mem-
bers of its society have not been able to rise above the corrupt environ-
                                                                                                             
 63. “Corruption in Nigeria has passed the alarming and entered the fatal stage and 
Nigeria will die if we keep pretending that she is only slightly indisposed.” CHINUA 
ACHEBE, THE TROUBLE WITH NIGERIA 38 (1984) (emphasis in original). For a detailed 
study of corruption in Nigeria, see Okechukwu Oko, Subverting the Scourge of Corrup-
tion in Nigeria: A Reform Prospectus, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 397 (2002); JULIUS 
O. IHONVBERE & TIMOTHY SHAW, ILLUSIONS OF POWER: NIGERIA IN TRANSITION 151 
(1998) (“Corruption has today permeated all aspects of Nigerian society and public af-
fairs; and private business can hardly make progress without indulging in some corrupt 
practices. In government, the judiciary, the universities and other educational institutions, 
the police and the army . . . corruption has become the main engine of activity.”). 
 64. In the world corruption ranking prepared annually by Transparency International, 
Nigeria has ranked among the most corrupt countries in the world. In 1999, Nigeria was 
ranked the second most corrupt country in the world, edged out by Cameroon. Transpar-
ency International Corruption Perceptions Index (1999), http://www.transparency. 
org/cpi/1999/cpi1999.html. In 2000, it was ranked the most corrupt country in the world. 
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2000), http://www.trans-
parency.org/cpi/2000/cpi2000.html. In 2001, it fell again to the second most corrupt 
country in the world. Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (2001), 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2001/cpi2001.html. Recently, the executive director of 
the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Antonio Maria Costa, speaking at the United Nations 
Anti-Corruption Conference in Mexico, revealed that Nigeria had lost more than five 
billion dollars in the last few years to corrupt practices. Iyefu Adoba, Nigeria Loses $5bn 
to Corruption, THIS DAY (Nig.), Dec. 12, 2003. 
 65. CONSTITUTION, art. 15(5) (1999) (Nigeria). 
 66. Nigeria does not keep accurate data on judicial corruption. See Maduagwu, supra 
note 28, at 13, 18–19 (discussing the prevailing culture of corruption). See also UNODC, 
Field Project, Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Capacity, (Aug. 29, 2005), http:// 
www.unodc.org/nigeria/en/judicialintegrity.html. My views, therefore, are based on re-
ports of studies, research, and newspaper accounts of judicial corruption in Nigeria. Sev-
eral studies have documented in detail corruption within the judiciary and the impact of 
corruption on the administration of justice. See, e.g., UNODC, supra note 57. 
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ment in which they live and operate.67 Though democracies all over the 
world deal with judicial corruption,68 slacking moral values, mounting 
economic hardships and ineffective detection and enforcement mecha-
nisms have turned this aberrant conduct into a full-blown national 
plague.69 Judicial corruption—abuse of judicial power for private gain—
is no longer an aberration or isolated conduct.70 It is disturbingly a domi-
nant and recurrent feature of the Nigerian judicial system.71 Judicial cor-
ruption often involves a vicious dynamic in which judges trade in justice 
for favors and personal gains.72 Judges tend to do what most Nigerian 
public servants do, use their official positions to enhance their incomes 
and power in society.73 Every aspect of the judicial process has suc-
cumbed to the scourge of corruption despite the provisions of the Code of 
Conduct for Judicial Officers,74 and criminal laws which demand that 
judicial officers refrain from engaging in unethical and corrupt behav-
ior.75 
Corruption seems to be the systemic disease of the Nigerian judiciary, 
and has generated complaints from all segments of the society, including 
                                                                                                             
 67. Judges are trapped in a culture that ranks wealth over honor and integrity. See 
Maduagwu, supra note 28, at 18–19. It is, therefore, not surprising that most of them 
seem unable to resist the urge to amass wealth even if it means engaging in corrupt and 
unethical practices. 
 68. See, e.g., MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER: ARROGANCE, CORRUPTION, AND INCOMPET-
ENCE ON THE BENCH (Basic Books 1998) (1969) (detailing instances of corruption and 
abuse of judicial powers in the United States). 
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 31, § 1(e) (reporting that “there was a wide-
spread perception that judges easily were  bribed or ‘settled,’ and that litigants could not 
rely on the courts to render impartial judgments . . . . Judges frequently failed to appear 
for trials, often because they were pursuing other means of income.”). 
 70. Petter Langseth, Judicial Integrity and its Capacity to Enhance the Public Interest 
20 (2002), http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp8.pdf (describing judi-
cial corruption as the use of adjudicational authority for the private benefit of court per-
sonnel in particular and/or public officials in general). Judicial corruption is not limited to 
giving and receiving bribes. It includes the use of official position to gain an advantage or 
to secure a benefit. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 31, § 1(e) (discussing the scope 
of judicial corruption). 
 71. P.O.E. BASSEY, THE NIGERIAN JUDICIARY: THE DEPARTING GLORY 38 (2000). 
 72. Tobi, supra note 29, at 82. 
 73. See Oko, supra note 63 (describing how every aspect of Nigerian society has 
succumbed to the Scourge of Corruption). 
 74. Concerned about the prevalence of unethical practices within the judiciary, the 
National Judicial Institute led by the Chief Justice of Nigeria introduced a Code of Con-
duct for Judicial Officers in 1998. Tobi, supra note 29. 
 75. See Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 77, § 98 (Nigeria); Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offenses Act, (2000) §§ 8–9 (Nigeria). 
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social commentators,76 lawyers,77 judges,78 and even the President.79 A 
study conducted in 2002 by A.J. Owonikoko reported that since 1999, 
more than fifty-five cases of corrupt practices80 have been processed by 
the National Judicial Council, the body charged with enforcing discipline 
in the judiciary.81 Many more allegations of judicial corruption are cur-
rently working their way through the National Judicial Council.82 
                                                                                                             
 76. Owonikoko, supra note 42; Okongwu, supra note 43. 
 77. Joseph Chu’ma Otteh, Restoring the Nigerian Judiciary to its Pride of Place, THIS 
DAY (Nig.), Apr. 13, 2004. 
 78. See Lillian Okenwa, Corruption in the Judiciary Threatens Democracy, THIS DAY 
(Nig.), Jan. 25, 2003. 
 79. President Obasanjo recently stated: “The process [of corruption] was accompa-
nied . . . by the intimidation of the judiciary, the subversion of due process, the manipula-
tion of existing laws and regulations, the suffocation of civil society, and the containment 
of democratic values and institutions.”  Obasanjo, supra note 41, at 1. 
 80. Owonikoko, supra note 42. 
 81. The National Judicial Council is a body established under the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria to advise on the appointment and removal of judicial offi-
cers. CONSTITUTION, 3d sched., pt. 1, § 20 (1999) (Nigeria). It consists of the Chief Jus-
tice of Nigeria who serves as the Chairman; the next most senior Justice of the Supreme 
Court who is the Deputy Chairman; the President of the Court of Appeal, five retired 
Justices of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal selected by the Chief Justice of 
Nigeria; the Chief Judge of the Federal High Court; five Chief Judges appointed by the 
Chief Justice from among the Chief Judges of the States and of the High Court of the 
Federal Capital Territory Abuja serving for terms of two years; one Grand Kadi ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of Nigeria from among the Grand Kadis of the Sharia Courts 
of Appeal for terms of two years; one President of the Customary Court of Appeal ap-
pointed by the Chief Justice of Nigeria from among the Presidents of the Customary 
Courts of Appeal for terms of two years; five members of the Nigerian Bar Association 
who have practiced for at least fifteen years, with at least one being a Senior Advocate of 
Nigeria, appointed by the Chief Justice of Nigeria on the recommendation of the National 
Executive Committee of the Nigerian Bar Association for terms of two years and subject 
to reappointment; and two non-lawyers, who in the opinion of the Chief Justice are of 
unquestionable integrity. Id. The National Judicial Council exercises disciplinary control 
over both federal and state judicial officers. CONSTITUTION, 3d sched., pt. 1, § 21(b), (d) 
(1999) (Nigeria). The individual states’ Judicial Service Committees exercise disciplinary 
control of the magistrates and other officials of inferior courts of record. See, e.g., 
CONSTITUTION, 3d sched., pt. 2, § 6(c), (d) (1999) (Nigeria).  For a detailed analysis of the 
structure and functions of the National Judicial Council, see generally Nnaemeka-Agu, 
supra note 25. 
 82. Lillian Okenwa, Election Petition: NJC Probes Appeal Court Judges, THIS DAY 
(Nig.), June 7, 2004, http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/06/07/20040607news 
02.html (“The National Judicial Council has commenced investigation into the allegation 
of perversion of justice and unethical conduct levelled [sic] against the President of the 
Court of Appeal, Justice Umaru Abdullahi, seven other Justices of the court, and the Reg-
istrar, Enugu Court of Appeal.”); Kola & Oladunjoye Aramide, Anambra: Judicial Body 
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Recently, the president of Nigeria, acting on the recommendations of 
the National Judicial Council, confirmed the compulsory retirement and 
dismissal of two judges of the Federal High Court, Justices Samuel Wil-
son Egbo-Egbo83 and C.P.N. Senlong.84 Justice Egbo-Egbo of the Fed-
eral High Court, Abuja, issued a string of ex parte orders under question-
able circumstances and clearly without jurisdiction.85 Each manifestly 
illegal order made without jurisdiction reinforced the public’s already 
abrasive contempt for the judiciary.86 Disturbingly, Justice Senlong, one 
of the most senior judges of the Federal High Court, was implicated in a 
bribery scandal that involved the unlawful influencing of other judges 
carrying out judicial functions.87 Judge Senlong was quickly suspended 
and ultimately dismissed from the bench for what the National Judicial 
Council described as “the despicable role he played in attempting to in-
fluence the decision of an election tribunal.”88 Judge M.M. Adamu, 
chairman of the tribunal and a judge of the Plateau State High Court, was 
also dismissed for receiving a bribe.89 
                                                                                                             
Probes Enugu Judge, THIS DAY (Nig.), Jan. 20, 2004, http://www.thisdayonline.com/arch 
ive/2004/01/20/20040120news03.html (reporting that the Vice Chair-man of the National 
Judicial Council, Supreme Court Justice Belgore, informed the press that “the council has 
initiated [an] investigation into the complaint against Justice Stanley Nnaji . . . .”); Lillian 
Okenwa, Supreme Court Justices, Tribunal Members Under Probe, THIS DAY (Nig.), 
Apr. 21, 2004, http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/04/21/20040421news01.html 
(reporting that the Supreme Court invited Interpol to investigate allegations by Derivation 
Front, a non-governmental organization, that some Justices of the Supreme Court col-
lected a five billion Naira bribe from one of the parties in a case involving the governor 
of Delta State). 
 83. Lillian Okenwa, Justice Egbo-Egbo Retired, THIS DAY (Nig.), Jan. 23, 2004, 
http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/01/23/20040123news02.html. 
 84. Lemmy Ughegbe, Chinyere Amalu & Ise-Oluwa Ige, Obasanjo Okays Dismissal 
of Federal High Court Judge, VANGUARD (Nig.), Feb. 26, 2004, http://www.news.biafra-
nigeriaworld.com/archive/2004/feb/26/0053.html. 
 85. Judge Egbo-Egbo issued an ex parte order restraining the governor of Anambra 
State from exercising his official duties. Okenwa, supra note 83. Judge Egbo-Egbo had 
earlier issued an order compelling the Independent Electoral Commission to declare the 
election result in favor of the petitioner. The judge issued the order fully aware of section 
285(1) of the Constitution which vests jurisdiction in election related matters in the Elec-
tion Tribunal. Id. Also, the judge issued an order barring the Senate President Anyim Pius 
Anyim and the Speaker of the House of Representatives Ghali Umar Na’ Abba from 
considering a bill currently before the National Assembly. Id. 
 86. See Otteh, supra note 77 (describing the lack of public trust in the judiciary). 
 87. Ughegbe, et al., supra note 84. 
 88. Nigerian Government Dismisses Three Judges Over Corruption, AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, Mar. 15, 2004, available at Westlaw: Africa News database. 
 89. Id. 
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At the state high courts where most of the cases are adjudicated, judi-
cial corruption is often far worse.90 Judicial corruption has devalued and 
debased society’s most fundamental mechanism for conflict resolution.91 
That so many judges are willing to ignore their oath of office and distort 
the legal process for personal and monetary gain remains one of the most 
pernicious impediments to a fair trial in Nigeria. 92 Far too often, the out-
come of a case depends not on the merits and strength of the case but on 
                                                                                                             
 90. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 31, § 1(e). For an account of corruption in 
state courts, see, for example, Nigeria; Rotten Judges, TEMPO (Nig.), Aug. 23, 2000, 
available at Westlaw: Africa News database. For example, the National Judicial Council 
suspended Judge Stanley Nnaji of the Enugu State High Court on charges of abuse of 
office for issuing an order that exceeded his jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitu-
tion. Lillian Okenwa, NJC Suspends Enugu Court Judge Over Ngige, THIS DAY (Nig.), 
Mar. 24, 2004, http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/03/24/20040324news02. 
html. Additionally, the Chief Judge of Plateau State was removed following allegations 
of impropriety leveled against him by the state branch of the Nigerian Bar Association. 
Funmi Peter-Omale, Plateau Chief Judge Fired, THIS DAY (Nig.), May 5, 2004, http:// 
www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2004/05/05/20040505news24.html. The Chief Judge of 
Ebonyi state, Justice Edward Isuama, was removed in 2000 for corruption. The suit he 
filed at the Federal High Court, challenging his removal was dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. Chinedu Eze, Court Confirms Ebonyi Chief Judge’s Dismissal, THIS DAY (Nig.), 
July 26, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7484036. The Abia State House of Assembly investigated 
allegations of corruption leveled against Justice K.O. Amah and recently passed a resolu-
tion calling for his immediate removal. Law and Human Rights: Why Abia Chief Judge 
Should Be Removed—Abia State House of Assembly (5), VANGUARD (Nig.), Apr. 30, 
2004, 2004 WLNR 7125634. 
 91. A United Nations study found that “corruption in the judiciary may turn out to be 
more harmful [than in other branches of government] because it could undermine the 
credibility, efficiency, productivity, trust and confidence of the public in the judiciary as 
the epitome of integrity.”  UNODC, supra note 57, at 57. 
 92. The adverse impact of a compromised judge on the search for justice is well 
documented by legal scholars all over the world. See, e.g., Zou Keyuan, Judicial Reform 
in China: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, 36 INT’L LAW. 1039, 1057 (2002) 
(“Judicial corruption could turn the rule of law to a rule of individuals pursuing their 
private interests. It undermines public confidence in judicial organs’ ability to implement 
laws and regulations, weakens the viability and effectiveness of the legal system and 
finally destabilizes the social order.”). Kyle W. Davis states: 
A judge who has been bribed, is under undue influence by government offi-
cials, or is acting in his or her own interests will not issue decisions grounded in 
law. The result of such decisions is that those with lawful rights and interests, 
rather than finding protection in the courts, see their rights being violated and 
their interests given to other people in an officially sanctioned proceeding. 
Kyle W. Davis, Purging the System: Recent Judicial Reforms in Kazakhstan, 8 U.C. 
DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 255, 268 (2002). 
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the whims and caprices of the presiding judge.93 Justice Akanbi, retired 
President of the Court of Appeal, provided an insightful and useful 
analysis of judicial corruption and its effect on judges. He stated: 
First is the problem of the corrupt judge. He is an afflicted person—just 
like the carrier of the AIDS virus or kleptomania. He suffers from a 
deadly disease. To him, justice is not his primary concern. No. What 
matters to him is the corrupt money that is turned over to him by his 
partners in crime. His conscience is warped. His judicial Oath means 
nothing, and so he hardly realises that he is an obstacle to justice ac-
cording to law. In any case, by his nature, he is a stranger to justice, and 
if he is not caught in the act, he remains a perpetual obstacle in the way 
of justice until perhaps Nemesis catches up with him. Otherwise, he is 
unable to appreciate, let alone administer justice according to law. 
Second is the dangerous and mischievous Judge who knows the law but 
prefers not to follow the law. He acts on whims and caprices. He as-
sumes jurisdiction where there is none. He declines jurisdiction where 
there is. To him, judicial precedence means nothing. His motive is dan-
gerous. His wig and gown are mere symbols of his ego. Again to this 
class of Judges, the judicial Oath is a mere cosmetic. Such a Judge is 
not only an obstacle to justice according to law, he is a danger to the 
entire Judiciary as an institution.94 
It is important to note that jury trials do not exist in Nigeria.95 Judges 
therefore play far larger roles and exercise significant discretion over 
questions of law and fact.96 For example, they make credibility assess-
                                                                                                             
 93. See Malachy Uzend, Casualties of Election Tribunals, DAILY CHAMPION (Nig.), 
Mar. 5, 2004, 2004 WLNR 6915262. The Daily Champion reported: 
[T]he NJC [National Judicial Council] . . . slammed its hammers on 104 judges 
for various offences, including misappropriation of court funds/maladministra-
tion; polarisation and politicisation of the judiciary; unprodutive/ineptitude/low 
court work; abuse of office/misuse of ex parte orders; general and persistent 
reputation for corruption and unethical behavior embarrassing to the judiciary. 
Id. 
 94. Muhammed Mustapha Akanbi, Retired President of the Court of Appeal, The 
Many Obstacles of Justice According to Law, Paper presented at the 1995 All Nigeria 
Judges’ Conference, in THE JUDICIARY AND THE CHALLENGES OF JUSTICE 33, 42–43 
(1996). 
 95. Though Nigeria inherited the British legal system, it did not inherit the jury trials. 
For a discussion of the legacy of English Law in Nigeria see JOHN OHIREIME ASEIN, 
INTRODUCTION TO NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 92–99 (1998). 
 96. See Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 47, at 230–36 (“In a case involving protection of 
rights, [the judge] is the ultimate protector of rights; and in a case which raises issues of 
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ments of witnesses and determine the relevance or weight to be attached 
to the testimony of witnesses.97 Given the enormity of powers enjoyed by 
judges, it is very easy for Nigerian judges to influence the outcome of 
cases. 
Judicial corruption has forced citizens to view with caution the role of 
the courts as impartial dispensers of justice. Nigerians are increasingly 
moving away from the notion of courts as impartial dispensers of justice, 
to the model of “cash and carry” justice where judges ignore precedents 
and even the law to subvert justice.98 Anyone who pays money or has the 
power to advance a judge’s career can dictate the judgment and sway 
court rulings and orders in his favor.99 Citizens are instinctively suspi-
cious of judges, and perhaps for good reasons.100 Despite mounting pub-
lic criticisms, the judiciary repeatedly demonstrates a tendency, espe-
                                                                                                             
conflicting rights of citizens, he can preserve or mar the stability of society by his deci-
sion.”). 
 97. These are normally powers exercised by jurors. See, e.g., EDWARD J. DEVITT ET 
AL., FED. JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 15.01 (4th ed. 1992) 
(“You, as jurors, are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of each of the wit-
nesses called to testify in this case and only you determine the importance or the weight 
that their testimony deserves.”). 
 98. Okongwu, supra note 43 (describing justice in Nigeria as a “cash and carry” af-
fair). See Owonikoko, supra note 42. 
 99. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 31, § 1(e). Motivations for deviating from 
judicial standards vary from judge to judge, but may generally involve any one or more 
of the following: “prospects of quick but unmerited career advancement; political ap-
pointment of a nominee of the judge; immediate financial gains; fear of job insecurity; or 
even membership of the same secret society with one of the parties to the dispute.”  
Deson Abali, Opinion, Nigeria: Corruption in the Judiciary, THIS DAY (Nig.), June 23, 
2003, http://support.casals.com/aaaflash1/new_busca.asp?ID_AAAControl=9579. 
 100. Retired Supreme Court Justice Chukwudifu Oputa eloquently states what the 
judiciary must do to regain public confidence: 
To inspire public confidence in the judicial process, judges should not only be 
transparently impartial but also should be seen to be accentuated only by the 
principles of justice and fair play. The judge should therefore scrupulously es-
chew bias in any shape or form. It is not merely of some importance, but is of 
fundamental importance, that justice should not only be done but should mani-
festly and undoubtedly be seen to be done. Justice must be rooted in confidence 
and confidence is destroyed when right minded people go away thinking—“the 
judge was biased.” 
Chukwudifu Oputa, Judicial Ethics and Canons of Judicial Conduct, in JUSTICE IN THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 34, at 201. 
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cially in high profile and election cases, to lend its process to the service 
of the powerful, well-connected and wealthy citizens.101 
The public perception of judicial corruption is so deeply embedded that 
citizens ascribe corrupt motives to honest judges who render decisions 
they find objectionable. In an atmosphere rendered already paranoid by 
stories of corruption, citizens believe every allegation of judicial corrup-
tion, however baseless or unfounded.102 Court decisions are often viewed 
by many as motivated by corrupt motives. When, for example, the Su-
preme Court ruled that the son of the former dictator Abacha was not a 
party to the murder of the late Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, rumor mills all 
over the country were agog that corrupt motives dictated the outcome of 
the case.103 Similarly, the assertion that the acquittal of those accused of 
killing the late justice minister Bola Ige was motivated by corruption 
continues to gain currency despite the absence of credible evidence to 
substantiate allegations of judicial corruption.104 
Public suspicion about the impartiality of the judiciary is reinforced by 
judges who render ostensibly bizarre and incoherent, if not illegal, ex 
parte orders.105 Former Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Bello, took 
judges to task for indiscriminately granting ex parte injunctions. He 
stated: 
I had the occasion to point out early this year that it was only in Nigeria 
that a court of law would restrain a university by order on an ex parte 
injunction from holding a convocation to award degrees to over a thou-
sand students who had passed their examinations. A court of law de-
                                                                                                             
 101. Ordinary citizens whose rights and interests have been affected by either the gov-
ernment or other citizens are disinclined to go to court because they feel that it is futile. 
Conversely, the powerful and well-connected citizens rush to court secure in the knowl-
edge that the court can be used to validate their positions. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra 
note 31, § 1(e). 
 102. Obasanjo, supra note 41, at 7. 
 103. See Louis Odion, Beatification of Corruption, THIS DAY (Nig.), Oct. 4, 2002, 
http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2002/10/04/20021004ext01.html (“[T]he Supreme 
Court which, against all logics of common-sense, acquitted Mohammed on the charge of 
the gruesome murder of an innocent and defenceless [sic] woman, Alhaja Kudirat Abiola 
. . . .”). 
 104. Fred Agbaje, Omisore’s Acquittal & Police Investigation, THIS DAY (Nig.), Nov. 
16, 2004 (discussing the negative public reactions to the acquittal of those accused of 
killing the former Attorney General Bola Ige). 
 105. SONIA AKINBIYI, ETHICS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN NIGERIA 225 (2003) (argu-
ing that “[t]hese detestable abuse [sic] of preservative injunctive orders via exparte [sic] 
application denigrate the legal profession and it is interpreted by the citizenry as a strong 
tool of corruption.”). 
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nied the deserving students who had passed their examination their de-
grees, because two students, who had failed the examinations had ap-
plied to the court for a declaration that they too were entitled to be 
awarded degrees. The National Electric Power Authority was restrained 
by an ex parte injunction from commissioning a power house to supply 
electricity to a town because there was a dispute between two contrac-
tors as to whom the Authority should pay the cost of a minor work 
done in the construction of the power house. A court of law denied 
electricity to the town simply because of the dispute between two con-
tractors. Indeed, there is an urgent need among some of us, the judges, 
to appreciate that ex parte injunction which was devised as a vehicle for 
the carriage of instant justice in proper cases should not be converted 
into a bulldozer for the demolition of substantial justice.106 
A particularly egregious illustration is the relatively recent ruling by an 
Enugu State High Court judge ordering the governor of a neighboring 
state to vacate his office.107 This is analogous to a judge in the state of 
Louisiana ordering the governor of Mississippi to vacate his office. Even 
more troubling, the trial judge made such a sweeping ex parte order in 
clear violation of both the law governing ex parte orders108 and the Code 
                                                                                                             
 106. Id. at 221–22 (quoting Mohammed Bello, C.J., address to the 1995 All Nigeria 
Judges’ Conference). 
 107. This ruling generated considerable public furor. The National Judicial Council 
promptly suspended the judge pending the outcome of a detailed investigation. After a 
detailed investigation and a formal hearing in which the judge was afforded the opportu-
nity to explain his conduct, the National Judicial Council recommended the dismissal of 
the judge. The recommendation has since been implemented by the Governor of Enugu 
State. See Tony Edike, Enugu Government Sacks Justice Nnaji, VANGUARD (Nig.), Sept. 
24, 2004. 
 108. The rule governing ex parte orders has been adumbrated by the courts in a num-
ber of cases. The tenor of the cases is that ex parte orders should only be made in cases of 
real urgency where such an order is necessary to preserve the rights of the parties pending 
the hearing of the case. See Tobi, supra note 29, at 40–42, discussing Chief Ojukwu v. 
Military Governor of Lagos State, (1986) 3 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 26) 39; Eguamwense v. 
Amaghizemiren, (1986) 5 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 41) 282; Okechukwu v. Okechukwu, (1989) 3 
N.W.L.R. (Pt. 108) 234. In Kotoye v. Central Bank of Nigeria, (1989) 1 N.W.L.R. (Pt. 
98) 419, the Supreme Court dealt with an interim injunction, ex parte, and held that the 
main features of an interim injunction are: 
(a)  It is made to preserve the status quo until a named date or until further or-
der or until an application on notice for an interlocutory injunction is heard. 
(b) It is for a situation of real urgency to preserve and protect the rights of the 
parties before it from destruction by either of the parties. 
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of Conduct for Judicial Officers.109 Even if the public was inclined to 
believe that these questionable decisions are the product of an honest 
misreading of the law, some of the judgments and court orders involve a 
level of naiveté that calls into question the fitness of the judge to occupy 
a high judicial office.110 The Chief Justice of Nigeria, Mohammed 
Uwais, expressed the view widely held by Nigerians regarding the mo-
tive behind such abuse of powers, stating, “The only inference to be 
drawn from such behaviors is that the judicial officers so involved cannot 
feign ignorance but are acting or acted deliberately in bad faith for im-
proper motives.”111 
B. Intimidation of Judges 
Available evidence indicates that rich and powerful Nigerians are in-
stinctively resistant to attempts to mediate conflicts and disputes through 
the judicial process.112 Their preferred mode of operation is to blunt de-
mands for justice by engaging in a dual strategy of intimidation and ma-
nipulation. The prevailing mindset is to bribe those who can be bribed 
                                                                                                             
(c) It can be made to avoid such an irretrievable mischief of damage when 
due to the pressure of business of the court or through no fault of the applicant 
to hear and determine the application on notice for interlocutory injunction. 
(d) What the court does in making an order of interim injunction is not to hear 
the application for interim injunction, ex parte, behind the back of the respon-
dent, but to make an order which has the effect of preserving the status quo un-
til the application for interlocutory injunction can be heard and determined. 
Tobi, supra note 29, at 42–43. 
 109. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS R. 2A(2) (1998) (Nigeria), http://www. 
nigeria-law.org/CodeOfConductForJudicialOfficers.htm (“A judicial officer must avoid 
the abuse of the power of issuing interim injunctions, ex parte.”). 
 110. Judges fuel speculations by making feeble and often implausible explanations 
about their clearly erroneous decisions. For example, when the National Judicial Council 
summoned the late Justice Kusherki of the High Court of the Federal Capital Territory to 
explain why he issued an ex parte order barring one of the registered political parties 
from holding its annual convention, the judge claimed that he was sick when he signed 
the order and did not realize what he did. The Council was unimpressed by his explana-
tion and recommended his removal from the bench. See Okenwa, supra note 83. Simi-
larly, Judge Egbo-Egbo offered an equally laughable explanation for issuing an ex parte 
order. He claimed that he did not read the order drawn up by his registrar before append-
ing his signature. Id. 
 111. M.L. Uwais, Chief Justice, Nigeria, Keynote Address at the Bar and Bench Con-
ference on Transparency and Integrity in the Administration of Justice at Abuja 4 (Jul. 
24, 2002) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 112. See infra Part II.C. 
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and intimidate those who refuse to be bribed.113 Bribery usually involves 
money, but may also include promises of elevation to the higher bench, 
typically to the Court of Appeal.114 Intimidation of judicial officers ex-
tends to all branches of the judiciary from trial courts up to the Supreme 
Court.115 Nigerian newspapers are replete with reports of harassment and 
intimidation of judicial officers.116 The murder trial of those accused of 
killing the late Attorney General of the Federation, Bola Age, was de-
layed for a long time because three judges separately refused to continue 
hearing the case, citing pressure from unnamed highly placed persons.117 
Judge Moshod Abaas recused himself, citing pressures from unusual 
quarters.118 This situation accurately portrays the unfortunate and uncom-
fortable situation in which judges find themselves once they assume ju-
risdiction in high profile cases.119 
The intimidation of judges assumed a disturbing dimension at a recent 
Court of Appeal hearing in Enugu.120 The presiding judge of the Court of 
Appeal, Justice Okechukwu Opene, publicly declared that he received 
threats from persons interested in the case.121 He stated, “Before I go on, 
I want to say my mind and that is my personal opinion. I am under pres-
                                                                                                             
 113. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 31, § e. 
 114. See Ahiante, supra note 54. 
 115. An example is a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of Nigeria by a group, the 
Derivation Front, uncomfortable with the way the case against the Governor of Delta 
State was being handled. See Chioma Anyagafu, We Can’t be Intimidated Says Uwais, 
VANGUARD (Nig.), Feb. 7, 2004, available at Westlaw: Africa News database. Inciden-
tally, this was not the first time a Chief Justice of Nigeria publicly complained about 
attempts to influence the Supreme Court. In 1983, Chief Justice Fatayi Williams “accused 
influential people of attempting to influence the Supreme Court.”  See BASSEY, supra 
note 71, at 39. He stated, “In the last few days all sort of persons, some eminent, others 
not so eminent, from a particular state in the country have tried to [sic] dictate to me as to 
who and who should sit on the appeals against the decisions of the election petition tribu-
nals which are before this court.”  Id. at 40. 
 116. The Chief Judge of Abia State was attacked by an unidentified assailant on his 
way to Umuahia. People familiar with the case believed that the attack was connected to 
a land dispute. See Joseph Ushigiale, Abia CJ Attacked, Escapes Unhurt¸ THIS DAY 
(Nig.), June 9, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7279441. 
 117. See Samson Ojo, Third Judge Abandons Omisore’s Case, DAILY TRUST (Nig.), 
July 31, 2003. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. See also Lohor & Efeizomor, supra note 30 (discussing the reluctance of 
judges to convict in high profile financial cases). 
 120. Ojo, supra note 117. 
 121. See Chuks Iloegbunam, Perspectives: Justice Nigeria, VANGUARD (Nig.), Mar. 2, 
2004, 2004 WLNR 7089011. 
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sure: there are calls and threats. But I have to go on with this matter.”122 
Soon after one of the justices delivered his minority opinion in the case, 
supporters of one of the parties to the case stormed the court premises 
and threatened to physically harm the judges.123 According to the news-
paper report, “The judges had to quickly flee through the back door 
midway into their judgments.”124 
The recent attempt to assault Appeals Court Justices in Enugu serves as 
a distressingly poignant reminder of the dangers involved in judging in a 
developing and corrupt environment where citizens believe that their in-
tervention is necessary to influence the outcome of a case.125 Despite the 
fact that it is clearly a crime in Nigeria for anyone to interfere with the 
administration of justice through threats, intimidation or offering gratifi-
cation,126 the fact that law enforcement authorities did not act decisively 
to protect the judges reveals a troubling absence of adequate protection 
for the judges.127 The reactions of judges who publicly complained of 
threats demonstrate the pervasive sense of unease engendered by the lack 
of adequate protection for judges. It is both curious and instructive that 
judges who notified the public of threats and pressures on them failed to 
name the culprits. Failure to name the culprits not only reflects the awe 
in which even judges hold powerful Nigerians, but it also displays a lack 
of faith in the ability of the system to protect judicial officers.128 
Threatening to physically harm judges is fast becoming a strategy of 
choice for citizens frustrated by the judiciary’s apparent inability to fol-
                                                                                                             
 122. Id. 
 123. See Charles Onyekamuo, Uproar!  As Judges Flee Enugu Court, THIS DAY (Nig.), 
Feb. 27, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7040034. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See BASSEY, supra note 71, at 31–37. 
 126. Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, (2000) Cap. 5, §§ 9, 18 (Nige-
ria). 
 127. Policemen are typically assigned to guard judges in Nigeria. An armed police 
orderly also accompanies the judge wherever he goes. Chief Justice Uwais has stated that 
judges can request extra protection if they feel threatened. Funke Aboyade, Law Person-
ality: State Judge Has No Jurisdiction Outside His State—Uwais, THIS DAY (Nig.), Jan. 
13, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7052956; see also Duke Solicits Legislature, Judiciary’s Assis-
tance to Combat Crime, THIS DAY (Nig.), June 22, 2002, 2002 WLNR 3383534 (reporting 
that magistrate judges threatened to go on strike if they were not provided adequate po-
lice protection). 
 128. Judges concerned about personal safety and skeptical of the ability of the state to 
protect them from disgruntled litigants tend to sacrifice the ideals of justice at the altars 
of personal safety. See, e.g., Ojo, supra note 117 (reporting that after receiving threats to 
his life, Justice Abbas could no longer hear the Omisore case because he would be unable 
to “administer justice without bias, fear or favour.”). 
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low the law. Threats are intended to and often do have a chilling effect 
on judges.129 Unchecked, threats on judges will fundamentally affect 
the way judges approach their functions. Feelings of insecurity engen-
dered by threats on judicial officers seriously undermine the security, 
tranquility and independence judges need to fairly and impartially dis-
pense justice.130 
C. Manipulation 
Besides displays of brute force, Nigerians, especially the executive 
branch and well-connected private citizens, impede the search for a fair 
trial by manipulating the judiciary.131 Often physical intimidation of judi-
cial officers is preceded or even accompanied by subtle but no less perni-
cious efforts to manipulate judges.132 Top government officials have little 
or no respect for the concept of separation of powers and unabashedly 
use their enormous powers to manipulate the judiciary.133 Interference 
with the judicial process is so deeply ingrained in the Nigerian culture 
that politicians continue to influence court proceedings despite reassur-
ances from the President.134 Governments, especially state governments, 
                                                                                                             
 129. The typical reaction of judges who receive threats has been to withdraw from the 
case. Id. No judge has had the courage to name the culprits or report them to the authori-
ties for appropriate disciplinary actions. Id. An environment in which judges publicly 
acknowledge attempts to influence them without disclosing the names of those who 
threatened them can hardly lead to an enhanced public confidence in the judicial process. 
 130. Karlan, supra note 39, at 537. 
 131. A U.S. Department of State study found that the Nigerian judiciary is “subject to 
considerable influence from the executive branch” and rated its independence lower than 
Ghana, Zambia and Namibia. UNODC, supra note 57, pt. II.A. 
 132. See, e.g., Ojo, supra note 117; Ushigiale, supra note 116. 
 133. See A. Akintunde & G. Akinsanmi, Only True Federalism Can Save Nigeria, 
THIS DAY (Nig.), Aug. 15, 2005, available at Westlaw: Africa News database. Top gov-
ernment officials view the court, not as independent institutions set up to resolve conflicts 
by impartially applying the law, but as extensions of the government. This mindset en-
courages them to engage in maneuvers aimed at making the courts more compliant to 
their wishes. Professor B.O. Nwabueze’s assessment of the attitude of politicians towards 
the judiciary still retains currency in contemporary Nigeria. He stated that “[b]ecause 
success in an election carries such high stakes, politicians in this country are strongly 
inclined and prepared to use pressure of various kinds to try to influence in their favour 
the judge’s decision—from lobbying to intimidation to outright bribery.”  B.O. 
NWABUEZE, NIGERIA’S PRESIDENTIAL CONSTITUTION 1979–83: THE SECOND EXPERIMENT 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 443 (1985). 
 134. President Obasanjo, in an address to the 1999 All Nigeria Judges’ Conference, 
reiterated his administration’s commitment to allow the judiciary to function without 
interference from the executive: “It is necessary to assure you that you will not come 
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use various techniques to manipulate the judiciary including the extreme 
case of offering gratification to judges.135 
The relationship between the government and the judiciary makes it 
much easier for government officials to manipulate judges. Though 
judges are appointed by the executive on the recommendations of the 
National Judicial Council,136 judges depend on the good relations with 
the government for many of their benefits like housing and transporta-
tion.137 Judges live with the anxiety that government officials, unhappy 
with their decisions, could make life difficult by denying them decent 
housing and transportation.138 Former High Court Judge P.O.E. Bassey, 
who experienced, firsthand, efforts by the government to diminish the 
authority and independence of judges stated: 
One of the whips used by civil servants to force Judges to “behave” is 
in the allocation of residential quarters . . . the mere fact of making 
Judges rely on the bureaucratic civil servants as to where to put their 
heads, with their families, is bad enough. And to hope that judges sub-
                                                                                                             
under the influence of the Executive and that your judgements and orders shall be 
obeyed.”  Obasanjo, supra note 41, at xxxviii. 
 135. NWABUEZE, supra note 133, at 443–45. 
 136. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 231, 281 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 137. Professor Musa Yakubu stated: 
It has been argued in recent years that the reason why the judiciary is not inde-
pendent as expected is that it is not completely independent of government con-
trol and influences. The judiciary has to look towards the government for staff 
accommodation, salary allowance, transport, stationery and other needs. It is 
further argued that if the judiciary is made self-accounting, it will be com-
pletely independent from the government and can perform freely without fear 
or favor. 
Aduba, supra note 34, at 406. 
 138. A.G. Karibi-Whyte, The Place of the Judiciary in the 1999 Constitution, in 1999 
ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 101. Karibi-Whyte stated: 
When the Executive controls what the Judiciary requires for discharging its 
constitutional functions, when the maintenance of the health and comfort of 
members of the Judiciary lies at the whims of the Executive; when the facilities 
for interaction with other judicial colleagues all the world over is controlled by 
the Executive, the only value left is that of impartiality which is maintained by 
the human spirit, and the sacred resolve to uphold the judicial oath. To what ex-
tent the vagaries of the executive oppression affects impartiality depends upon 
the pain threshold of the individual Judges and resistance of the injustice in-
flicted by the executive misdemeanours. 
Id. at 149. 
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jected to such pressures could still be generally independent of their of-
ficialdom is an illusion.139 
Pressures exerted on judges by the executive profoundly inhibit their 
ability to approach their duties with the level of objectivity and inde-
pendence necessary to secure a fair trial.140 It is therefore not surprising 
that some judges go out of their way to demonstrate their fealty to the 
executive.141 Similarly, due to the pervasive influence of local politicians 
in the judicial selection and promotion process, judges who contemplate 
a higher judicial office often show restraint in cases that involve party 
stalwarts.142 
The dual strategy of intimidation and manipulation has throttled the ju-
dicial process and made it difficult for citizens to obtain a fair trial.143 
Judges, fearful of reprisals from government functionaries, seem eager to 
do whatever is necessary to remain in the government’s good graces, 
sacrificing in the process the citizens’ fair trial rights.144 Watching the 
ease with which the executive manipulates the judiciary and observing 
the advantages gained by judges who pander to the wishes of the execu-
tive, most judges submit to the cultural orthodoxy of judicial subservi-
                                                                                                             
 139. BASSEY, supra note 71, at 20. 
 140. See Susan Webber Wright, In Defense of Judicial Independence, 25 OKLA. CITY 
U. L. REV. 633, 635 (2000) (“A judge who is concerned that his or her rulings might af-
fect his or her career is a judge who might lose focus on the most important of judicial 
duties: to maintain the rule of law.”). 
 141. Some judges have the courage to stand up to overbearing public officials, but 
accounts of those who do are rarely reported. See NWABUEZE, supra note 133, at 444 
(“Exposed to such pressures, especially when they come from highly placed politicians, 
friends and relations, some judges may have found themselves unable to resist them. 
Lobbying is indeed a powerful instrument of persuasion and perhaps of coercion too.”). 
 142. Elevation to the higher bench often does not depend on competence and integrity 
of the judge as evidenced by their judicial track record. Rather, a judge’s contacts with 
the powerful have become major determinants of career advancement in the judiciary. 
See Abali, supra note 99. 
 143. Fair trial demands that courts and tribunals “decide matters before them without 
any restrictions, improper influence, inducements, pressure, threats or interference.”  See 
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & 
Protection of Minorities, The Right to a Fair Trial: Current Recognition and Measures 
Necessary for its Strengthening: Final Report, at 68, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/ 
24 (June 3, 1994) (prepared by Stanislav Chernichenko & William Treat). 
 144. According to Murray Gleeson, the Chief Justice of Australia: “The right of citi-
zens to be assured that disputes, including disputes to which governments are parties, will 
be decided independently and impartially, demands that judges go about their duties un-
influenced by the threat of reprisals or the possibility of rewards.”  Gleeson, supra note 
55. 
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ence to the political elites. That judges depend on the executive to pro-
vide them with amenities like housing and transportation seems to be at 
odds with the dictates of judicial independence.145 The sad reality re-
mains that judges who function under precarious circumstances tend to 
succumb to pressures and compromise ethical standards to appease the 
powers that be.146 Trials conducted by intimidated judges lead to miscar-
riages of justice and make a mockery of the constitutional requirement of 
a fair trial.147 
D. Institutional Problems 
1. Delay 
The right to a fair trial in Nigeria is guaranteed by the Constitution, 
which provides in Section 36(1), “In the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations, including any question or determination by or against 
any government or authority, a person shall be entitled to a fair hearing 
within a reasonable time by a court or other tribunal established by 
law.”148 Unfortunately, trials in Nigeria are never speedy or heard within 
a reasonable time.149 Studies conducted by human rights organizations 
and scholars identify delay as one of the major obstacles to the search for 
justice through the courts.150 For example, Hurilaw, a Nigerian non-
governmental organization found that, “[e]xtreme delay in litigation in 
the courts is routine. On the average, hearing in a case at first instance in 
a Nigerian superior court can take as long as 5–6 years with another 3–4 
years consumed in appellate proceedings.”151 A study conducted by Hu-
                                                                                                             
 145. Karibi-Whyte, supra note 138, at 163 (“As long as the Judges are beholden to the 
Executive for the important facilities, such as health, transport, housing and indeed mate-
rial for the performance of their duties, the principle of judicial independence envisaged 
in the Constitution will remain theoretical and a sham.”). 
 146. I.O. Agbede, The Rule of Law: Fact or Fiction, in ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN 
NIGERIA: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HON. JUSTICE MOHAMMED LAWAL UWAIS 137, 143 
(Ademola Yakubu ed., 2000) (“The more ambitious judges may wish to curry the favour 
of the Executive by deliberately going out of their way to pervert the course of justice in 
order to please the executive organ and gain its favour.”). 
 147. See supra note 128. 
 148. CONSTITUTION, art. 36 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 149. See generally Niki Tobi, Delay in the Administration of Justice, in JUSTICE IN THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS, supra note 34 (discussing the personal and institutional problems that 
affect the speedy administration of justice). 
 150. See infra notes 151–55. 
 151. HURI-LAWS, LEGISLATIVE AGENDA FOR GOOD GOVERNANCE IN NIGERIA 1999–
2004, at 9 (1999). 
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man Rights Watch found that “[d]elays plague the course of litigation 
against oil companies.”152 A survey of the problems of access to courts in 
Nigeria, conducted by Dr. Jedrzel George Frynas, a Professor at Coven-
try University, lists delay as one of the impediments frustrating access to 
the courts. He stated: 
Delay in the disposal of cases is perceived as the fourth most important 
problem of access to courts in Nigeria. This appears to be due primarily 
to the congestion in the courts, which manifests itself through the high 
number of pending cases. Cases in Nigerian courts including appeals 
may take over 10 years before reaching a final verdict. Sometimes the 
original litigants will have died by the time the judgment is made.153 
The survey conducted by Dr. Frynas, which consisted of field study, 
interviews and analytical examinations of cases and legal documents, 
empirically confirmed the prevailing views in Nigeria about the slow 
pace of litigation.154 In fact, there is hardly any case which is heard with 
any real degree of urgency or desire to comply with the provisions of the 
Constitution.155 Even the election petition of Mohammadu Buhari against 
the election of Nigeria’s current president, Olusegun Obasanjo, who was 
declared the winner of a general election in May 2003, was pathetically 
                                                                                                             
 152. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF OIL: CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN NIGERIA’S OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES 157 (1999) 
[hereinafter PRICE OF OIL]. 
 153. Jedrzej George Frynas, Problems of Access to Courts in Nigeria: Results of a 
Survey of Legal Practitioners, 10 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 397, 410 (2001). 
 154. Late Justice Aguda’s assessment of the inadequacy of the Nigerian judiciary in 
1986 is still relevant, perhaps more so in contemporary Nigeria. He stated: 
The present incredibly slow process of judicial administration is frightening 
and oppressive . . . . A judicial system which can permit a simple case, for ex-
ample, of wrongful termination of employment, to remain in the courts for over 
five years cannot be said to be running smoothly. Whatever happens at the end 
of such an aberration of court trial can hardly be said to be justice . . . . Our pre-
sent system of judicial administration is a bankrupt system, and it is very sad 
indeed that no government from independence in 1960 to this moment has ever 
made any conscious effort to re-organise or modernise this bankrupt system. It 
is an inexplicable irony that whilst some of our other smaller sister-countries in 
the so-called Third World are taking giant steps in the technological age of the 
21st century, we are satisfied to continue to wallow in the stinking stenches of 
the 19th. 
T. AKINOLA AGUDA, THE CRISIS OF JUSTICE 14–15 (1986). 
 155. See generally Frynas, supra note 153. 
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and ridiculously still pending before the Court eighteen months later.156 
If such a case cannot be heard within a reasonable time (which should 
have been before inauguration), then one wonders what case can. In fact, 
eight months after Nigeria’s last elections, several petitions filed in vari-
ous states were yet undetermined, and some had not been heard at all.157 
To curb the delays in court proceedings, the 1999 Constitution imposed 
a time limit for judgments to be delivered after hearing and addresses of 
counsel.158 Judges are now required to deliver judgment not later than 
ninety days after the conclusion of evidence and final address by coun-
sel.159 Even this laudable provision seems to have been drained of rele-
vance by the Supreme Court in Egbo v. Agbara.160 The Supreme Court 
ruled that failure to deliver a judgment within the ninety-day period 
specified by the Constitution is not fatal where the case is entirely docu-
mentary or rests mainly on interpretation of some document where the 
credibility or demeanor of witnesses is not involved.161 
                                                                                                             
 156. See Charles Coffie Gyamfi, Guobadia Chides Tribunals Over Delayed Results of 
Polls Petitions, GUARDIAN (Nig.), Aug. 23, 2004, http://news.biafranigeriaworld.com/ar-
chive/2004/aug/23/009.html (“Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commis-
sion (INEC) Dr. Israel Abel Guobadia said . . . that he was disappointed . . . where 18 
months after the general elections, litigations arising from them had not been brought to a 
conclusive end. [He] was particularly displeased that hearing[s] . . . including one on the 
presidential election had not commenced.”); Ise-Oluwa Ige, Court Dismisses Buhari’s 
Petition, Voids Polls in Ogun, VANGUARD (Nig.), Dec. 21, 2004, http://www.vanguard 
ngr.com/articles/2002/headline/f121122004.html. 
 157. Olawale Olaleye, Unresolved Election Petitions Heighten Tension in States, THIS 
DAY (Nig.), Jan. 27, 2004, 2004 WLNR 6995175. 
 158. CONSTITUTION, art. 294(1) (1999) (Nigeria) (“Every court established under this 
Constitution shall deliver its decision in writing not later than ninety days after the con-
clusion of evidence and final addresses and furnish all parties to the cause or matter de-
termined with duly authenticated copies of the decision within seven days of the delivery 
thereof.”). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Egbo v. Agbara, [1997] 1 N.W.L.R. 293 (Nigeria). 
 161. Justice Iguh, delivering the lead judgment stated: 
In a case for instance, which is entirely documentary or rests mainly on the in-
terpretation of some documents without the demeanour or credibility of wit-
nesses coming into play, delay cannot be any matter of great moment. So, too, 
where credibility of witnesses is not involved, delay may not be material. It 
therefore seems to me that delay, per se is not sufficient reason for the interfer-
ence with the judgment of a trial court. For the complaint to succeed, it has to 
be further established that the delay occasioned a miscarriage of justice in that 
the trial judge did not take a proper advantage of having seen or heard the wit-
nesses testify or that he had lost his impressions of the trial due to such inordi-
nate delay. 
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2. Inadequate Infrastructure 
Infrastructural deficiencies such as aging, deteriorating and ill-
equipped physical facilities severely undermine the fair and speedy ad-
ministration of justice.162 Justice can hardly be speedy when judges lack 
adequate facilities to enable them to function effectively and effi-
ciently.163 A study conducted by Human Rights Watch found: 
Court facilities are hopelessly overcrowded, badly equipped, and un-
derfunded. Interpreters may be nonexistent or badly trained. Court li-
braries are inadequate. There are no computers, photocopiers, or other 
modern equipment; and judges may even have to supply their own pa-
per and pen to record their judgment in longhand. If litigants need a 
transcript of a judgment for the purposes of an appeal, they have to pay 
for the transcript themselves.164 
Infrastructural deficiencies in Nigeria undermine the search for a fair 
trial in several ways. First, poor infrastructure permits, if not encourages, 
corruption.165 Records of court proceedings and judgments are stored in 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 316. 
 162. See Akanbi, supra note 94, at 46 (“The old and archaic equipment used in most 
courts have the effect of slowing the work of the court; they contribute in no small way to 
the congestion of cases in courts; they cause delay and incidentally delay leads to a denial 
of justice.”). 
 163. President Olusegun Obasanjo accurately captured the deplorable state of the judi-
ciary in his address to the 1999 All Nigeria Judges’ Conference: 
We are in sympathy with the judiciary. The conditions under which you have 
had to work over the years are appalling, deplorable and intolerable. Court-
rooms are old and dilapidated. There are no good libraries, and court proceed-
ings, including judgements and rulings are taken in long hand. Basic facilities 
like stationery, file jackets are not available. Litigants are compelled to pur-
chase files for their cases. In most cases, your residential accommodations are 
poor and poorly furnished. Some of you have no serviceable vehicles. Some are 
obliged to commute to and from your offices by public transport. You are frus-
trated by these unsavory conditions under which you perform your duties. 
Obasanjo, supra note 41, at xxxvii. 
 164. See PRICE OF OIL, supra note 152, at 156. 
 165. Chief Gani Fawehinmi, one of Nigeria’s leading lawyers and foremost human 
rights activist, during his investiture with the rank of Senior Advocate of Nigeria, pointed 
out the problems of inadequate facilities in the judiciary: 
As a result of long-hand notes, there is little or no access to record of proceed-
ings to court users, which in turn promotes corruption and other forms of ma-
nipulations. The judicial officers control their records and can therefore control 
outcomes to larger extents . . . . Mechanising judicial record taking and record 
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less than satisfactory conditions, thus making them susceptible to dam-
age or intentional destruction by unscrupulous citizens.166 Absence of 
modern facilities provides an enabling environment for corrupt and un-
ethical court officials to tamper with evidence and even court records.167 
Allegations of tampering with court records forced the Court of Appeal 
to order that a “handwritten judgment it delivered on the matter” must be 
tendered for scrutiny.168 
Second, a far more debilitating effect of inadequate infrastructure, par-
ties are limited in the kinds of technological and visual aids available 
throughout litigation. The courtrooms are not equipped to handle audio, 
slide and other visual presentations that assist fact-finders in understand-
ing the case and reaching a just decision.169 Lamenting the infrastructural 
deficiencies in Nigerian courts, Osita Okoro, a lawyer, stated: 
The hardware and software of the court system is moribund . . . . Re-
cord keeping and document management facilities and procedures are 
rudimentary. Court libraries are outdated, compelling judges to borrow 
books from lawyers appearing before them. Time saving court proce-
dures such as discovery and interrogatories are largely regarded by the 
Bench and the Bar alike as novelties. Modern information technology 
and office equipment are virtually unknown. Verbatim recording of tri-
                                                                                                             
keeping will not only address delays in court proceedings but also promote 
transparency and integrity in the judicial process. 
Chino Obiagwu, Anniversary Special: Judiciary Score Card 1999–2003, VANGUARD 
(Nig.), May 30, 2003. 
 166. Id. The ongoing controversy as to whether a state governor was the same James 
Ibori who was convicted in the mid-nineties by the Bwari Upper Area Court would not 
have arisen if Nigeria had a reliable document archival and retrieval system. Some citi-
zens of Delta State filed an action seeking to disqualify the state governor, James Ibori, 
contending that as an ex-convict, he was constitutionally barred from holding office. 
They alleged that he was the person, James Onanefe Ibori, convicted in 1995 by the 
Bwari Upper Area Court. The Governor countered that he was not the same James Ibori. 
The absence of a modern and credible archival system has made it difficult for the police 
to positively identify the person who was convicted in 1995. See generally Stephen Kola-
Balogun, Ibori: Victim or Villain?, THIS DAY (Nig.), Aug. 21, 2004, 2004 WLNR 
7408798 (discussing alleged tampering with certain court records, the removal of certain 
documents, the police department’s failure to provide important reports, and its failure to 
collect fingerprints and passport photos of the man convicted in 1995). 
 167. See Obiagwu, supra note 165. 
 168. Charles Onyekamuo, Anambra: Appeal Court Requests Handwritten Judgment, 
THIS DAY (Nig.), Feb. 11, 2004, 2004 WLNR 7006828. 
 169. See PRICE OF OIL, supra note 152, at 156. 
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als is not available; judges are compelled to manually record proceed-
ings in long hand.170 
Unable to mount technical evidence because of inadequate infrastruc-
ture, the plaintiff who bears the burden of proof is significantly disadvan-
taged and must suffer his or her fate without any other avenue for redress 
or meaningful assistance from the system. 
Furthermore, judges in Nigeria decide all issues of fact as well as 
law.171 The task is painfully cumbersome due to the lack of stenogra-
phers. Judges struggle with recording all the evidence in long hand, 
while trying to get impressions on the demeanor of the witnesses and 
fielding legal arguments, objections and interjections from lively Nige-
rian lawyers.172 It is little wonder that most cases take years to hear.173 
The absence of stenographers in Nigerian courts has two undesirable ef-
fects. It leads to inordinate delays since a judge can only write so fast, 
and it often leads to corruption as handwritten judgments can be easily 
altered by judges who are so inclined.174 
Lastly, inadequate facilities, especially erratic power supply, contribute 
to delays as court proceedings are often interrupted or adjourned due to 
power outages.175 Discussing the effect of power outages on Nigeria, 
                                                                                                             
 170. Osita Okoro, The Judiciary and the New Development Agenda, THIS DAY (Nig.), 
Dec. 22, 2003. 
 171. See supra note 95. 
 172. See Mobolaji Sanusi, Why We Oppose Anti-Graft Commission—Senator Udo 
Odoma, VANGUARD (Nig.), Jan. 7, 2003, available at Westlaw: Africa News database; 
Chidi A. Odiankalu, Judicial Boredom No Respect of Eminence, THIS DAY (Nig.), Mar. 
19, 2002, available at Westlaw: Africa News database; Ahamefula Ogbu & Ikenna 
Emewu, The Nigerian Judiciary: 40 Years After, THIS DAY (Nig.), Oct. 3, 2000, avail-
able at Westlaw: Africa News database. 
 173. Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, a lawyer and a social commentator, observed that “[t]he 
very idea of judicial officers taking evidence and submissions in long hand 43 years after 
independence is abhorring if not shameful . . . . This is one of the major causes of delay 
in the administration of justice in Nigeria.”  Adegboruwa, supra note 52. 
 174. Chino Obiagwu, a lawyer and national coordinator of the Legal Defense and As-
sistance Project, a non-governmental organization, stated that “as a result of long hand 
notes, there is little or no access to record of proceedings to court users, which in turn 
promotes corruption and other forms of manipulations.” Chino Obiagwu, Anniversary 
Special: Judiciary Score Card 1999–2003, VANGUARD (Nig.), May 30, 2003. 
 175. Ebun-Olu Adegboruwa, The Judiciary Must Guard Against Corruption, 
GUARDIAN (Nig.), June 3, 2003, at 8 (“sittings are adjourned for lack of electricity. . . . 
Judicial officers cannot dream of generators at home or even a functional telephone line, 
either for domestic or official use. These appalling conditions only serve to discourage 
judges . . . moreso [sic] when it seems to be a deliberate policy of the executive to starve 
the judiciary of funds.”). 
2005] SEEKING JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 45 
 
Professor Olukoju stated that “[i]ndividual[s] and corporate citizens of 
Nigeria have suffered enormous economic and social losses and incon-
veniences from the inefficiency and corruption of [the National Electric 
Power Authority]. Constant outages have damaged electrical and elec-
tronic equipment and disrupted and bankrupted fledgling or otherwise 
thriving commercial and industrial enterprises.”176 
III. DEALING WITH THE PROBLEMS OF THE JUDICIARY 
I have attempted to show in Part I of this Article how corruption, ma-
nipulation and intimidation of judges and the lack of adequate facilities 
undermine the courts’ ability to adjudicate disputes fairly and efficiently. 
The problems discussed above, especially corruption, executive manipu-
lation and intimidation of the judiciary, are not unique to Nigeria.177 Ma-
ture democracies, notably the United States of America and Britain, dealt 
with these problems by introducing reform measures that significantly 
minimized, if not contained the problems discussed above.178 In Nigeria, 
however, the problems of the judiciary have been exacerbated and ren-
dered more intractable because of the nature of the society and the inabil-
ity, or perhaps unwillingness, of elected officials and the judiciary to 
tackle the problems and initiate measures that will enable the judiciary to 
function more effectively.179 As discussed in Part II, judicial corruption 
and executive interference with the judiciary are both pervasive and en-
demic.180 Unchecked, these problems cripple the judiciary and may ulti-
mately lead to a reversal of democratic gains.181 This portion of the paper 
                                                                                                             
 176. Ayodeji Olukoju, ‘Never Expect Power Always’: Electricity Consumers’ Re-
sponse to Monopoly, Corruption and Inefficient Services in Nigeria, 103 AFF. AFR. 51, 66 
(2004). 
 177. Judiciaries all over the world have faced, and continue to deal with similar prob-
lems. See generally MARY L. VOLCANSEK ET AL., JUDICIAL MISCONDUCT: A CROSS 
NATIONAL COMPARISON (1996) (reviewing how judicial misconduct is addressed in 
France, Italy, England and the United States). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See supra Part II.C. 
 180. See supra Part II. 
 181. Nigeria returned to democratically elected civilian government after fifteen years 
of military rule. Supreme Court Justice Uwaifo recently described the negative impact of 
corruption on the democratic process: 
Some recent events seem to sound an alarm bell . . . what omen does this trend 
of falling standards portend for the country?  First, a culture of compromise 
will take root in the dispensation of justice. Second, public confidence will be 
badly and broadly eroded. Third, democracy will suffer or even collapse. 
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will examine how Nigeria can contain and possibly eliminate the prob-
lems that disable the judiciary from responding to the needs and chal-
lenges of a democratizing and developing Nigerian society. My aim, 
here, is to offer suggestions that will help make the judiciary fairer, 
transparent and more efficient. 
The Nigerian judicial structure is still in disarray, crippled by a constel-
lation of institutional and personal problems.182 Judicial corruption is just 
the capstone of a decaying and dilapidated infrastructure. Judicial offi-
cers lack the necessary resources, independence and integrity needed to 
judge fairly and impartially.183 As a result of these problems, government 
officials, party stalwarts and private citizens with enough resources to 
either bribe or intimidate judicial officers continue to influence judicial 
proceedings.184 It is therefore not surprising that a widespread perception 
exists among the citizens that the judiciary is unable to constrain abuse of 
power and administer justice fairly and impartially.185 
                                                                                                             
Okenwa, supra note 78. 
 182. The desecration of the judiciary that became more pronounced during the military 
interregnum remains with us. J.A. Ajakaiye, The Constitutional Role of the National Ju-
dicial Council with Regard to Collection and Disbursement of Funds to the Judiciaries: 
Problems and Prospects, in 2001 ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 127, 132–33 
(2003). One had hoped that the end of military rule would also mark the end of the woes 
of the judiciary. Chief Judge J.A. Ajakaiye, of Ekiti State, described the tactics adopted 
by the military to emasculate the judiciary: 
It paid the military regimes not to grant financial autonomy to the judiciary. 
This indirectly helped in crippling the judiciary. There were numerous in-
stances of victimization. Police orderlies were withdrawn at the pleasure of the 
commissioners of police. Subvention to a state judiciary was reduced and the 
chief judge was denied the opportunity to attend an international conference 
like his counterparts because he gave judgment, which was distasteful to the 
state government. Judges were forced out of their [official] quarters or had the 
light and water and telephone cut off for giving judgments against the govern-
ment. Orders of court against the government were treated with disrespect and 
disdain. 
Id. 
 183. See PRICE OF OIL, supra note 152, at 156 (“Judges, magistrates and other court 
officers . . . are very poorly paid. Court facilities are hopelessly overcrowded, badly 
equipped, and underfunded . . . . Court libraries are inadequate. There are no computers, 
photocopiers, or ether modern equipment; and judges may even supply their own paper 
and pens to record their judgment in longhand . . . . This financial crisis encourages the 
acceptance of  bribes . . . .”). 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. See Otteh, supra note 77. 
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The problems of the judiciary, especially corruption and manipulation, 
exact substantial and enduring costs on the citizens, the legal profession, 
the judiciary and the Nation. Calls for reform come from different 
sources. The international community, concerned about the survival of 
the rule of law and consolidating the country’s fledgling democracy,186 
the Nigerian public, outraged by improper exercise of judicial powers, a 
government battling to regain the confidence of foreign investors and a 
profession eager to recapture its dignity, all seem to agree that something 
must be done to remodel the judicial architecture disassembled by years 
of rapacious military rule.187 An honest, competent and efficient judiciary 
will benefit all.188 More importantly, an honest judiciary will help Nige-
ria consolidate and deepen its fragile democracy and check the tyrannical 
instincts of elected officials.189 This part of the paper examines four ways 
                                                                                                             
 186. The Chief Justice of Nigeria, M.L. Uwais, in his welcome address to the 2001 All 
Nigeria Judges’ Conference acknowledged the support of international agencies in “help-
ing the [Nigerian] Judiciary to strengthen its integrity and capacity, fight corruption and 
improve access for litigants to justice.”  See Uwais, supra note 3, at xxxv–xxxvi. The 
international agencies mentioned by the Chief Justice include the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the British Department for International Devel-
opment (DFID), the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and 
the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODC). Id. For an 
account of efforts by the United Nations to strengthen the capacity and integrity of the 
judiciary in Nigeria, see Nicholas A. Goodling, Nigerian’s Crisis of Corruption—Can the 
U.N. Global Program Hope to Resolve This Dilemma?, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 997 
(2003). 
 187. For the state of the judiciary under the military regime, see D.A. Ijalaye, Professor 
Emeritus, Obafemi Awolowo University, The Bench, the Bar and the Rule of Law Under 
the Military Regime in Nigeria, lecture at the Law Week of the Nigerian Bar Association, 
Ilorin Branch (Feb. 6, 1991) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 188. A group of Chief Justices and high level judges invited by the United Nations 
Center for International Crime Prevention and Transparency International to help formu-
late a program to strengthen judicial integrity identified a set of preconditions necessary 
to curb judicial corruption. Langseth, supra note 70, at 9. The group identified the follow-
ing conditions: fair remuneration, transparent procedures for judicial appointment, adopt-
ing and monitoring of the judicial code of conduct, declaration of assets and computeriza-
tion of court files. Id. at 11–13. 
 189. According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Chukwudifu Oputa: 
The judiciary is the mighty fortress against tyrannous and oppressive laws. It is 
the judiciary that has to ensure that the State is subject to law, that the govern-
ment respects the right of the individual under the law. The courts adjudicate 
between the citizens inter se and also between the citizens and the State. The 
courts therefore have to ensure that the administration conforms with the law; 
they have to adjudicate upon the legality of the exercise of executive power. 
Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 47, at 228–29. 
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of improving the quality and integrity of the judiciary: appointing the 
right caliber of judges, punishing corrupt judges, providing continuing 
judicial education and bolstering judicial independence. 
A. Background of the Judges 
Securing fair trial rights is inextricably tied to the quality of judges 
who adjudicate disputes.190 One of the most effective ways to deal with 
judicial corruption is to ensure that only competent and honest judges get 
to the bench.191 It is unrealistic, perhaps preposterous, to simultaneously 
push for reforms that preserve fair trial rights while at the same time 
staffing the judiciary with incompetent and corrupt judges. Nowhere is 
the need for high caliber judges more pressing than in a transitional soci-
ety like Nigeria where prolonged military dictatorship has taken its toll 
on the judiciary.192 Military rule set in motion a process of appointing 
judges without due regard to the integrity and competence necessary to 
ensure a fair trial.193 The same pattern of appointing ill-qualified judges 
                                                                                                             
 190. Professor Osipitan has stated, “The quality of justice depends more on the quality 
of men who administer the law than on the content of the law they administer. Unless 
those appointed to the bench are competent and upright and free to judge without fear or 
favour, a judicial system however sound its structure may be on paper is bound to func-
tion poorly in practice.”  Taiwo Osipitan, Professor, Faculty of Law, Univ. of Lagos, 
Thoughts on the Independence and Integrity of the Judiciary in Nigeria, Paper delivered 
at Judicial Independence Workshop (Dec. 2002), available at http://nigerianewsnow. 
com/News/December02/530103_lawlecture.htm. See also Maria Dakolias, A Strategy for 
Judicial Reform: The Experience in Latin America, 36 VA. J. INT’L L. 167, 172 (1995) 
(“[T]he quality and integrity of a judicial system can be measured best by the quality and 
integrity of its judges.”). 
 191. The Honorable Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of Australia, describes the right 
background for judges. “The capacity of an individual to make an impartial determination 
of the facts, and to understand and conscientiously apply the law, is the primary require-
ment of fitness for judicial office.”  C.J. Murray Gleeson, Austl., Judicial Legitimacy, 
Speech Before the Australian Bar Association Conference (July 2, 2000), http://www. 
hcourt.gov.au/speeches/cj/cj_aba_conf.htm. 
 192. See Okechukwu Oko, The Problems and Challenges of Lawyering in Developing 
Societies, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 569, 573 (2004). 
 193. Dr. Olu Onagoruwa, former Attorney General of the Federation stated: 
Under the military, a great deal of arbitrariness in judicial appointments have 
been made in utter disregard for the institutional mechanisms set up for that 
purpose. In some cases judges have been appointed in utter contempt for public 
opinion. This military interference in judicial appointment has led to the ap-
pointment of mediocrities to the bench. The situation is pathetic in the new 
states and in the federally controlled judiciaries where civil servants, mostly, 
are appointed. In many cases these new judges neither have the practicing ex-
2005] SEEKING JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 49 
 
threatens to undermine the integrity and competence of the judiciary un-
der the current democratic administration.194 
Under the 1999 Constitution, judges are appointed by the President195 
or Governor196 on the recommendation of the National Judicial Coun-
cil.197 The appointment process, especially the screening of judges by the 
National Judicial Council, was designed to ensure the appointment of 
judges with the requisite competence and integrity.198 The goal of screen-
ing out unsuitable judicial nominees will only be achieved if the National 
Judicial Council approaches its functions with a genuine sense of de-
tachment and objectivity and confines itself to issues relating to integrity, 
character and competence as evidenced by the nominee’s professional 
track record and academic achievements.199 Regrettably, the appointing 
authorities have allowed personal prejudice and ethnic and political con-
                                                                                                             
perience that has accrued to the practicing lawyers nor the grit to withstand ex-
ecutive pressure. Many of them still manifest that executive hangover. 
Olu Onagoruwa, Challenge to the Independence of the Bar—Decree 21 of 1993 Consid-
ered, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN NIGERIAN LEGAL SYSTEM 127, 133 (E. Smaranda 
Olarinde et al. eds., 1995). 
 194. Retired Nigerian Supreme Court Justice Anthony Aniagolu’s scathing indictment 
of the appointment procedure for judges deserves the attention of everyone involved in 
the appointment of judges in Nigeria: 
Nowadays, the appointment of bad judges, in different parts of the country, is 
now taking centre stage among the constraints of the Judiciary. No more spe-
cial scrutiny is exercised in the appointment of some Judges. In earlier days 
people frowned at the appointment of candidates regarded as not sufficiently 
knowledgeable in Law, or weak, generally in their commitment to the Law. 
Nowadays candidates who are known to be openly corrupt manage to secure 
appointments as Judges. 
Anthony Aniagolu, Constraints in the Administration of Justice, in 1999 ALL NIGERIA 
JUDGES’ CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 86. 
 195. Federal judges are appointed by the President. The appointment process is some-
what different for the Chief Justice of Nigeria and the Justices of the Supreme Court. 
Their appointments require further confirmation by the Senate. See CONSTITUTION, arts. 
230–39 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 196. State judges are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of the Na-
tional Judicial Council. Id. art. 271. 
 197. See CONSTITUTION, ch. 7 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 198. See Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25, at 10. 
 199. President Obasanjo urged the appointing authority for judges “to ensure through 
rigorous screening and painstaking appointment procedures, that the best materials, in 
terms of learning and character get appointed to the bench.”  Obasanjo, Uwais Cautioned 
Judges of Ex Parte Injunction, DAILY TRUST, Dec. 10, 2003. 
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siderations to preponderate over competence.200 The appointment proce-
dure lends itself to abuse and often produces results that are inconsistent 
with the goals of an honest and competent judiciary.201 Ethnic loyalties, 
corruption and political favoritism have so infused the selection process 
that some people who are demonstrably ill-qualified to serve as judges 
have been appointed.202 Chief Richard Akinjide, a Senior Advocate of 
Nigeria and former Attorney General of Nigeria, implicitly acknowl-
edged the problems with the appointment of judges in Nigeria. Respond-
ing to a question dealing with corruption within the judiciary, he stated: 
First of all, the process of appointing judges into the judiciary is very 
bad and why should you base appointment into the judiciary on the area 
where somebody comes from. Supposing that area does not have the 
right quality, you turn appointment to the judiciary as if it is political 
appointment or board appointment. They do that at the federal level, 
they do that at the state level. I mean in some local governments, they 
will say they have no judge and you must appoint a judge from that lo-
cal government, so they bring a fourth grade lawyer to be a judge. 
Whereas in other local governments, there are first class and better ma-
terials. So that is affecting the quality at all levels, which is very unfor-
tunate, it should not happen . . . . This ethnic mentality has been carried 
                                                                                                             
 200. Professor Taiwo Osipitan expressed dissatisfaction with the procedure for the 
appointment of judges. He stated: 
The procedure and criteria for the appointment and promotion of judicial offi-
cers are not transparent . . . . [E]xcept for the requirement of post-call experi-
ence, the factors which influence the members of the commission in their deci-
sion whether to nominate or not to nominate a person for appointment or pro-
motion are known to members alone. This has resulted in intensive lobbying by 
those who aspire to become judges. In some cases, appointments and promo-
tions are not based on merit but the strength or the connection of the appointee. 
A judicial officer whose appointment or promotion is the product of lobbying is 
unlikely to be independent, in cases involving his benefactors. 
Osipitan, supra note 190. 
 201. See id. 
 202. Supreme Court Justice, Niki Tobi observed: 
Although the Constitution makes clear provisions on the appointment of judi-
cial officers, the application of the provisions at times bring [sic] some prob-
lems. There are known instances where recommendations are made not on the 
merits but on grounds of favouritism and nepotism . . . . The position is fairly 
ugly these days. Some candidates go about campaigning for appointment as 
Judges and they do so shamelessly. 
Otteh, supra note 77. 
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so far and it has affected the quality of the appointment we are mak-
ing.203 
Nigeria has degenerated to a position where ethnic origin, social back-
ground and connections have become far more important than compe-
tence and integrity.204 Judicial appointment based on patronage increases 
the likelihood of appointing judges who pander to the wishes of their 
benefactors.205 Problems resulting from the appointment of ill-qualified 
judges will be less severe or perhaps completely eliminated if the ap-
pointing authorities screen out incompetent and unqualified candi-
dates.206 Appointment should be limited to lawyers who have sufficiently 
demonstrated their integrity, both personally and professionally.207 Pro-
                                                                                                             
 203. LagosForum.com, Interviews, We’re in Elected Dictatorship—Akinjide, http:// 
www.lagosforum.com/interv.php?NR=114 (last visited Aug. 15, 2005). 
 204. Otteh faults the present mode of appointing judges: 
[T]he recommendation of the candidates have been sourced from among a very 
exclusive, privileged but tiny group whose predilections will spring from a 
broad mix of peculiar affinities: thus while one person might prefer a candidate 
because his or her state of origin is Lagos State, another might make a recom-
mendation because a candidate is the son of a political benefactor; yet, another 
judge would recommend a candidate because that candidate was particularly 
obsequious while he or she acted as Chief Registrar. Who loses the chance to 
get recommended?  Mr. Eligible, who did not, or will not plug into the circuit 
of that privileged class. 
Otteh, supra note 77. 
 205. KAYODE ESO, FURTHER THOUGHTS ON LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 264 (2003) (“A 
judge, whose appointment has been so influenced by the Governor, might consider him-
self, or, at the least, be so considered, by the public, to whom he should appear independ-
ent, (and this is worse) to be answerable to his benefactor, the Governor.”). 
 206. The United Nations’ Office on Drugs and Crime recommended: 
[T]here is a need to institute more transparent procedures for judicial appoint-
ments to combat the actuality or perception of corruption in judicial appoint-
ments (including nepotism and politicization) and in order to expose candidates 
for appointment, in an appropriate way, to examination concerning allegations 
or suspicion of past involvement in corruption. 
UNODC, supra note 57, at 50. 
 207. The Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Chief Akinlolu 
Olujinmi, recently called for the appointment of judges with the right training and back-
ground. He stated: “Aware that the administration of justice is bound to suffer delay if 
judges are not adequately trained or equipped, we will discourage the appointing of ill 
qualified persons to the bench on account of political patronage and other extra legal 
considerations.”  Akinlolu Olujinmi, Agenda for Justice Sector Reform, THIS DAY (Nig.), 
Nov. 16, 2004, http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2003/08/26/20030826law07.html. 
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fessor Musa Yakubu urges that judges “should be men of unimpeachable 
antecedent, men of high probity. Men of unassailable intellect, men who 
could not balk under pressure.”208 Limiting judicial appointments to law-
yers of proven competence and integrity will numb public fears that 
judges are beholden to the appointing authorities and will also enhance 
the independence of the judiciary.209 As the Chief Justice of South Africa 
stated in an address to the International Commission of Jurists, “The cul-
ture of judicial independence must be sustained by procedures for ap-
pointment to the bench which are fair, transparent, and reasonable and in 
which the judicial input is substantial and manifest.”210 Judges appointed 
on the basis of competence and integrity can easily approach their duties 
without fear or favor and inspire confidence both from the public and the 
profession.211 
A major problem, however, with recruiting high quality judges is that 
few good and successful lawyers are interested in taking up judicial ap-
pointments.212 For a long time, appointment to the higher bench was 
                                                                                                             
 208. Aduba, supra note 34, at 406–07. 
 209. The former Chief Justice, Hon. Justice Mohammed Bello, once stated that “in 
order to ensure the perfection of the independence of the judiciary, the criteria for and 
mode of appointment of Judges should be based on no other consideration than the suit-
ability, competence, integrity, learning and incorruptibility of the appointees.” Niki Tobi, 
The Legal Profession and the Quest for Genuine National Integration and Development, 
in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE NIGERIAN NATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHIEF AFE 
BABALOLA 27, 41 (Yemi Akinseye-George ed., 2000). 
 210. CEELI, supra note 34, § II.B. 
 211. Marvin E. Aspen, The Search for Renewed Civility in Litigation, 28 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 513, 519 (1994) (“Judges cannot ask lawyers to accept a standard of professional 
conduct to which they do not abide.”). The quality and integrity of the judiciary will be 
significantly enhanced if the appointing authorities adopt the standards formulated by 
Nigeria’s preeminent jurist, retired Supreme Court Justice Oputa: 
The qualities of courage, honesty and integrity required of judges are meant to 
ensure that they do not either under pressure or of their own volition yield their 
moral authority and that they do not in the process of decision making allow 
themselves to be swayed from the path of truth and justice. The qualities of 
firmness and impartiality will allow the judge to turn the wheels of justice ob-
jectively and not subjectively . . . . [I]n the halls of justice the battle is for the 
truth and against expediency. It is a battle for protection from power or its 
abuse . . . . It needs a man of commensurate moral fibre and moral courage to 
stand up to this assault from power, to maintain his balance and deliver justice. 
AKINBIYI, supra note 105, at 110 (quoting Oputa, J., from a lecture at Obafemi Awolowo 
University). 
 212. A study conducted by the Constitutional Rights Project, a Nigerian non-
governmental organization, found that “[t]he low wages attributed to judicial officers has 
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viewed as the hallmark of a successful legal career.213 Judges enjoyed 
such preeminent positions both within and without the legal profession 
that a career in the judiciary proved attractive to most lawyers.214 All of 
that has changed. Lawyers prefer, instead, to become Senior Advocates 
of Nigeria.215 Consequently, lawyers seeking judicial appointments and 
some who eventually get appointed may not be the finest legal minds.216 
Some of them may even lack the right moral fiber to serve as judges. 
Reluctance to accept judicial appointments results from a constellation 
of factors including inadequate pay, poor working conditions and more 
importantly, the diminished status of judges in Nigerian society.217  To 
                                                                                                             
discouraged independent-minded lawyers in private legal practice from taking up posi-
tions in the bench, as such lawyers are reluctant to give up relatively lucrative private 
practices for poor judicial positions.”  NWANKWO ET AL., CONST. RIGHTS PROJECT, 
NIGERIA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 2000, at 28 (2000). 
 213. See generally AKINBIYI, supra note 105. 
 214. ESO, supra note 205, at 282 (“It must be recognized . . . that an appointment to the 
Bench carries . . . with it, enormous prestige and honour . . . . [S]ome of those who are 
now on the Bench and also those who have retired from it, joined the system mainly on 
account of this honour and prestige . . . .”). 
 215. Nigeria has a special class of lawyers analogous to the Queens Counsel in Eng-
land, known as Senior Advocates of Nigeria. ASEIN, supra note 95, at 237. The title of 
Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) is conferred on lawyers who distinguish themselves in 
the field of advocacy. See Legal Practitioners Act, (1990) Cap. 207, § 5 (Nigeria). For a 
discussion of the criteria for conferring the title of Senior Advocate of Nigeria on law-
yers, see ASEIN, supra note 95, at 237–44. 
 216. See A.A.M. Ekundayo, The Legal Profession and the Nigerian Nation in the 21st 
Century, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE NIGERIAN NATION: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
CHIEF AFE BABALOLA 117, 125 (Yemi Akinseye-George ed., 2000) (“The 20th century 
Nigerian nation has seen many erudite, courageous, honest and brilliant judges. Unfortu-
nately, the close of the century is also witnessing the arrival of an increasing number who 
are by no means as erudite, courageous, honest and brilliant.”). 
 217. See Muhammed Mustapha Akanbi, Retired President of the Court of Appeal, The 
Need for Proper Funding of the Judiciary, Speech given at the Special Sitting of the Court 
of Appeal, Kaduna Division (July 4, 1994), in THE JUDICIARY AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 95, 99 (1996). Akanbi succinctly captured the depressing plight 
of the judiciary in Nigeria: 
Some of the problems facing the Judiciary are only known to insiders. It is 
common knowledge for those who care to know, that the salary is poor, the 
conditions of service unattractive and the glories of the past no more. And it is 
a truism to say that the Judiciary is the worst hit by the pervading atmosphere 
of political instability and insensitivity. It has not been possible for the Judici-
ary to develop or fulfill itself because more often than not it is financially ham-
strung. 
Id. 
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encourage lawyers to take up appointment, Nigeria must find ways to 
burnish the image of the judiciary. The judiciary must be reestablished as 
an honorable and respectable branch of the legal profession.218 Salary 
and working conditions must be reviewed to provide better conditions of 
service.219 Improved working conditions, especially enhanced salary 
structure, will enable the judiciary to recruit and retain high quality 
judges with the requisite integrity, competence and judicial temperament. 
Increasing remuneration of judges may also reduce the temptation for 
them to engage in corrupt activities to augment their meager salaries.220 
B. Sanctions 
Despite Nigeria’s transition to democracy, judges who have been ap-
pointed more for their contacts than competence and who have internal-
ized the corruption developed during years of military interregnum have 
not shaken off those values.221 The most dramatic way to promote pro-
bity in the judiciary is to punish erring judges.222 Nothing undermines the 
                                                                                                             
 218. ESO, supra note 205, at 282 (“There must be honour attached to the post, for the 
honour of being on the Bench is not altogether, nor always, a matter of CASH. It is more 
a matter of honour.”). 
 219. Retired Supreme Court Justice Kayode Eso stated: 
The judiciary must be so reformed and the conditions of service made so attrac-
tive as to attract the best brains from all sectors of the law. The reformation 
could not be complete until the institution is able to attract seasoned legal prac-
titioners, of the Senior Advocate [of Nigeria] class, to its fold. Indeed, what 
should be aimed at is that appointees, other than such advocates should also be 
top lawyers and well- established advocates in their spheres of life, that the 
Senior Advocates, who have been invited for appointment, would be made 
proud of the peers that would be appointed with them. 
Id. 
 220. Some scholars find a nexus between poor salary structure and judicial corruption. 
See, e.g., CEELI, supra note 34, § IV.G (“A more sensitive issue is whether the failure to 
fairly compensate judges inadvertently promotes corruption. Otherwise honest and de-
pendable individuals may be more likely to succumb to offers of gifts and bribes by un-
scrupulous attorneys or wealthy litigants when they need to supplement their meager 
incomes.”); Langseth, supra note 70, at 6 (reporting that studies list low remuneration 
among the causes of judicial corruption). 
 221. See Onagoruwa,  supra note 193. 
 222. As described in In re Schenck: 
[J]udges are disciplined primarily to preserve public confidence in the integrity 
and impartiality of the judiciary. Thus, disciplining judges serves to educate 
and inform the judiciary and the public that certain types of conduct are im-
proper and will not be tolerated. Discipline of a judge also serves to deter the 
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integrity and public confidence in the justice system more than well-
founded allegations of impropriety by judges.223 Swift and fair disposi-
tion of allegations of misconduct not only restores public confidence but 
also induces attitudinal and behavioral changes among judicial offi-
cers.224 For a society yearning for accountability, a nation eager to see 
judicial corruption rooted out, punishing corrupt judges is key.225 A con-
trary measure, one that glosses over corruption, will destroy public con-
fidence and encourage citizens to resort to corrupt practices in an attempt 
to level the playing field.226 
Punishment, or threat of it, will pressure judges to respond or adapt to 
acceptable judicial behavior. It forces judges to reevaluate the choices 
they make. Sanctions convey to judges in a very powerful way that abuse 
attracts unpleasant consequences. Sanctions also have the potential to 
influence the conduct of other judges and may assuage the injured feel-
ings of the public, who feel justifiably outraged by judicial miscon-
duct.227 
The National Judicial Council administers the disciplinary regime for 
judges in Nigeria.228 In addition to screening and recommending judicial 
nominees, it also investigates allegations of judicial misconduct and rec-
ommends punishment to the appropriate authorities.229 It has played a 
more aggressive role in articulating and enforcing standards of judicial 
conduct.230 Following complaints that raise sufficiently serious or appar-
                                                                                                             
disciplined judge as well as other judges from repeating the type of conduct 
sanctioned. 
In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 207 (Or. 1994). 
 223. Justice Mohammed Uwais admonished judges by stating, “The slightest suspicion 
of corruption of a Judge tarnishes the reputation of other judicial officers and brings the 
entire institution into disrepute.”  Uwais, supra note 3, at xxxiii. 
 224. See In re Schenck, 870 P.2d at 190. 
 225. See In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d 705, 715 (Or. 1998) (stating that judicial discipline 
serves not only to protect the public by deterring misconduct, it also serves to preserve 
the public’s trust by informing the judiciary and the public that judicial misconduct will 
not be tolerated). 
 226. See supra Part II.A (for an account of how judicial corruption undermined public 
confidence in the judiciary). 
 227. See In re Gallagher, 951 P.2d at 715. 
 228. CONSTITUTION, 3d sched., § 21(b) (1999) (Nigeria). 
 229. The National Judicial Council consists of experienced jurists who understand the 
intricacies of judging and are deeply concerned about the integrity of the judiciary. See 
Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25, at 7. 
 230. For an assessment of the role of the National Judicial Council, see generally 
Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25. 
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ently well-founded allegations of impropriety, the National Judicial 
Council typically suspends the erring judge pending the outcome of a 
detailed investigation and a full-blown hearing in which the complain-
ants and the judge have the opportunity to state their positions and ex-
plain their conduct.231 Sanctions that the National Judicial Council could 
recommend232 against judges found guilty of impropriety include admo-
nitions,233 suspension,234 retirement235 and in some cases outright dis-
missal.236 
Judicial impropriety falls into two broad categories: violations of the 
Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers237 and criminal conduct. In cases 
of non-criminal conduct that violate the Code, the National Judicial 
Council should be the final authority to investigate and recommend pun-
ishment.238 If, however, the misconduct amounts to a crime, the National 
Judicial Council should, in addition to recommending sanctions, refer the 
matter to the appropriate authorities for further investigation and possible 
                                                                                                             
 231. Akinwale Akintude, NJC Commended For Suspending Erring Judges, THIS DAY 
(Nig.), Feb. 3, 2004 (reporting that NJC recently suspended four judges for allegedly 
receiving bribes, and another judge, Justice Senlong, was suspended for allegedly influ-
encing the judgment of a tribunal). 
 232. In choosing the appropriate sanction, the National Judicial Council should always 
take into account the purposes of disciplining judges so eloquently stated by the Oregon 
Supreme Court in In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 190, 207 (Or. 1994). 
 233. Minor ethical violations are normally addressed by admonishing the offending 
judicial officer. As suggested by the Oregon Supreme Court, “Censure may be appropri-
ate in a particular case for extra-judicial conduct that violates the Code, but which is not 
directly related to a judge’s performance in office.” In re Schenck, 870 P.2d at 209. This 
reasoning apparently motivated the National Judicial Council to recommend reprimand-
ing the Chief Judge of Abia State for paying monies belonging to the state judiciary into a 
private fixed account. See Leonard Dibia, Nigeria; Abia State Judicial Crisis, DAILY 
CHAMPION (Nig.), Dec. 7, 2004. 
 234. In most cases, the National Judicial Council suspends judges accused of miscon-
duct while it conducts a full scale investigation. See Immunity and the Long Arm of the 
Law, VANGUARD (Nig.), Feb. 21, 2003, available at Westlaw: Africa News database. 
 235. Okenwa, supra note 83 (reporting that the Federal Government retired Justice 
Egbo-Egbo following the recommendations of the National Judicial Council). 
 236. Justices Senlong and Adamu, accused of receiving bribes, were dismissed outright 
from the bench. See Nigerian Government Dismisses Three Judges, supra note 88. 
 237. The code of conduct for judicial officers typically “serves as a template for disci-
plinary norms for judges.”  Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes Toward Con-
fronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1425, 1430 (2004). 
 238. CONSTITUTION, 3d sched., § 21(b) (1999) (Nigeria).   
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criminal prosecution.239 For example, bribery is both a violation of the 
Code240 and a crime.241 Therefore, a judge accused of bribery may be 
sanctioned by the National Judicial Council and prosecuted for the same 
offense. 
Disciplinary proceedings initiated by the National Judicial Council 
should not preempt or preclude further criminal prosecution of the of-
fending judge, if the facts so demand. Criminal prosecutions and disci-
plinary proceedings serve entirely different purposes. Disciplinary pro-
ceedings initiated by the National Judicial Council essentially serve to 
ensure compliance with the ethical standards of the judiciary242 while 
criminal sanctions serve to reaffirm society’s disdain for conduct desig-
nated as a crime.243 
Depending on the nature of the crime and the outcome of the criminal 
prosecution, the Nigerian Bar Association should also look further into 
the matter to see if it merits disbarment.244 Judges, after all, are lawyers 
                                                                                                             
 239. The Independent Corrupt Practices Commission can prosecute judges accused of 
corruption without waiting for a referral from the National Judicial Council. See Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offenses Act, (2000) § 6 (Nigeria) (stating that it is the duty 
of the Commission to, among other things, prosecute persons suspected of violating the 
Act or other laws prohibiting corruption and that “[e]very prosecution for an offence 
under [the] Act or any other law prohibiting bribery, corruption and other related offences 
shall be deemed to be done with the consent of the Attorney General.”). For example, the 
Commission is currently prosecuting the Chief Judge of Akwa Ibom, Justice Effiong 
David Idiong for allegedly receiving a bribe. The National Judicial Council had earlier 
investigated Justice Idiong and cleared him of the charges that form the basis of the in-
dictment by the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission. See Lillian Okenwa, ICPC 
can Prosecute Akwa Ibom CJ, THIS DAY (Nig.), Jan. 26, 2005, 2005 WLNR 1100034. 
 240. The Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers provides, “A Judicial Officer and 
members of his family shall neither ask for nor accept any gift, bequest, favour, or loan 
on account of anything done or omitted to be done by him in the discharge of his duties.”  
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS R. 3F(1) (1998) (Nigeria). 
 241. Bribery is prohibited by the Criminal Code. See Criminal Code Act, (1990) Cap. 
77, §§ 98–99 (Nigeria); see also Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offenses Act, 
(2000) § 8 (Nigeria). 
 242. In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 210 (Or. 1994) (“[Discipline] is necessary to main-
tain public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary that demands ad-
herence to standards of conduct it has set for itself and for the fair administration of jus-
tice.”). 
 243. See generally MICHAEL TONRY, HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 345–66 
(1998) (discussing the theories and purposes of punishment). 
 244. Automatic disbarment should follow convictions for designated crimes. Criminal 
conviction is a valid ground for imposing disciplinary sanctions on lawyers. See Legal 
Practitioners Act, (1990) Cap. 207, § 11(1)(b) (Nigeria) (defining unprofessional conduct 
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and as such are still subject to the disciplinary control of the bar associa-
tion. A lawyer convicted of a crime is typically disciplined by the bar. It 
would be anomalous, indeed preposterous, if a judge guilty of a crime 
were merely dismissed from the bench and allowed to retain the privilege 
to practice law.245 
The legal profession should clearly articulate the kinds of judicial im-
propriety that warrant taking further disciplinary action against a judge 
who has been sanctioned by the National Judicial Council. Serious 
crimes such as fraud, theft and accepting or receiving bribes are suffi-
ciently injurious to the integrity of the legal profession to justify further 
actions by the bar.246 Instances where the judge has not been criminally 
prosecuted or has engaged in minor impropriety are far more problem-
atic. In such cases, the bar should have the discretion to decide whether 
the sanction recommended by the National Judicial Council is enough 
both to convey to the judge the futility of violating the law and to reas-
sure the public, or whether further action is needed to preserve the honor 
of the legal profession.247 
The National Judicial Council has been greeted with great public en-
thusiasm because of its well-publicized efforts to promote accountability 
                                                                                                             
to include conviction for a criminal offense which is incompatible with the status of a 
legal practitioner). 
 245. Some jurisdictions allow the lawyers’ disciplinary mechanism to sanction a law-
yer for acts committed while acting in a judicial capacity. See, for example, In re 
McGarry, 44 N.E.2d 7, 12 (Ill. 1942), where the Illinois Supreme Court stated, “An attor-
ney at law while holding the office of judge may be disciplined for acts of immorality, 
dishonesty, fraud or crime and his licence taken away, and the fact of his holding a judi-
cial office at the time does not render him immune from punishment.”   See also State ex 
rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Sullivan, 596 P.2d 864, 869 (Okla. 1979) (finding that a lawyer 
can be disciplined for acts committed in his official capacity only if “such acts involve 
moral turpitude, of a fraudulent, criminal or dishonest character”). 
 246. In re Abuah, [1962] 1 ALL N.L.R. 279, 283 (Nigeria). The Nigerian Supreme 
Court held that conviction for a criminal offense prima facie makes a person unfit to 
continue to practice law. Id. See also In re Seaman, 627 A.2d 106, 121 (N.J. 1993) (cita-
tions omitted) (describing the role of sanctions in maintaining judicial independence). 
 247. The standard articulated by the Nigerian Supreme Court in In re Abuah may pro-
vide some guidance in such cases: “We think it is plain and it is commonsense that the 
Court is not bound to strike a man off the rolls unless it is satisfied that the criminal of-
fence of which he has been convicted is of such a nature as to make him unfit to practice 
without loss of self-respect, or whether one can still consider him a fit and proper person 
to be entrusted with the grave responsibilities which are demanded of a member of the 
profession.”  In re Abuah, [1962] 1 ALL N.L.R. 279, 283 (Nigeria). 
2005] SEEKING JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 59 
 
within the judiciary.248 In recent times, the National Judicial Council has 
aggressively investigated instances of judicial impropriety and has not 
hesitated to recommend sanctions against erring judges in appropriate 
cases.249 Sanctioning judges is commendable in light of the social accep-
tance of corruption in Nigeria and the frequency of allegations of judicial 
corruption.250 The National Judicial Council’s insistence on probity and 
accountability has made a lasting impression on judges who now operate 
with a heightened awareness of their limitations.251 
Even for a society eager and perhaps desperate to tackle judicial cor-
ruption, sanctions should be handled with the utmost care. Sanctioning 
judges, even a mere reprimand generally considered to be the mildest 
sanction, significantly undermines the integrity and the moral standing of 
the affected judges.252 Citizens, lawyers and judges agree that judicial 
corruption should be aggressively tackled. At the same time, however, 
                                                                                                             
 248. A non-governmental organization, Igbo Integrity Foundation, commending the 
efforts of the National Judicial Council stated: 
[T]hese sanctions meted by [the National Judicial Council] to judges who are 
bent on dragging the name of the judiciary to the mud, has demonstrated once 
again that, after all there is somebody out there who can still stand and defend 
the battered image of the judiciary in this country. 
Chimaobi Nwaiwu, Group Lauds National Judicial Council’s Decision on Erring Judges, 
VANGUARD (Nig.), Apr. 7, 2004, available at Westlaw: Africa News database. Similarly, 
the Lawyers League for Human Rights commended the National Judicial Council for 
taking disciplinary actions against corrupt judges. In a press release, the group stated: 
[T]he National Judicial Council’s decision was a step in the right direction 
which demonstrated that the judiciary has the capacity to deal with cases of al-
legations of misconduct against judicial officers with dispatch and that the judi-
ciary is alive to its duty of self discipline to wield inherent powers to show the 
public that it is on top of any situation. 
Akintude, supra note 231. 
 249. See Ughegbe, et al., supra note 84, at 1 (“Between 1999, when the National Judi-
cial Council (NJC) came into being, and now, it has considered hundreds of petitions 
from litigants across the federation against judicial officers bordering on professional 
misconduct. The Council, to date, has disposed off [sic] at least 105 of the cases, recom-
mending punishment where necessary.”). 
 250. See supra Part II.B. 
 251. See Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25. 
 252. See Ruffo v. Conseil de la Magistrature, [1995] S.C.R. 267, 341 (Can.) (Sopinka, 
J., dissenting) (“[A] reprimand is an extremely serious punishment for a judge. A repri-
manded judge is a weakened judge: such a judge will find it difficult to perform judicial 
duties and will be faced with a loss of confidence on the part of the public and liti-
gants.”). 
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they wish and expect that investigations of alleged judicial impropriety 
be conducted in a fair and respectful manner and take account of the 
need to maintain the independence of the judiciary.253 
A tension will always exist in the judiciary between accountability and 
independence.254 The challenge for Nigeria and indeed all constitutional 
democracies is “how to detect judicial corruption accurately, to investi-
gate it fairly, and to eradicate it effectively without eroding an independ-
ent judiciary.”255 The National Judicial Council must proceed with con-
summate care to maintain the delicate balance between independence 
and accountability. The concept of judicial independence will be drained 
of meaning and relevance if judges are corrupt.256 On no account should 
judicial independence operate to bar the National Judicial Council from 
investigating genuine and credible allegations of impropriety.257 Aggres-
sive enforcement of judicial standards is necessary not only to ensure 
probity, but also to promote public confidence in the judicial process.258 
On the other hand, the need for accountability should not be allowed to 
denigrate judicial independence and the capacity of judges to discharge 
their functions without fear or favor. The National Judicial Council must 
maintain a delicate balance between enforcing disciplinary standards so 
                                                                                                             
 253. Long, supra note 60, at 5 (“Judicial independence and judicial accountability are 
the twin goals of the judiciary.”). 
 254. For a discussion of the tension between accountability and judicial independence, 
see Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial 
Independence: Comparative Perspectives, 28 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 341, 344–45 (1998); see 
also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Counter-
majoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 215–56 (2002) (examining the 
tensions between judicial independence and accountability). 
 255. Wallace, supra note 254, at 344. 
 256. See id. at 345 (noting that independence will be weak if corrupt behavior is preva-
lent); see also Jon Mills, Principles for Constitutions and Institutions in Promoting the 
Rule of Law, 16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 115, 127 (2003) (“[C]orruption is a threat to judicial 
independence because it creates a suspect relationship between the litigant’s court and the 
litigant, which results in final decisions based on considerations other than proper appli-
cation of legal principles.”). 
 257. Wallace, supra note 254, at 344–45; see Steven Lubet, Judicial Discipline and 
Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 60 (1998) (“[T]o be sure, judi-
cial independence does not require absolute immunity, so it is hardly threatened when 
judges are called to account for personal transgressions.”); see also Emily Fied Van Tas-
sel, Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service—and Disservice 
1789–1992, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 334 (1993) (“[J]udicial independence was probably 
not intended to trump judicial accountability for misbehavior.”). 
 258. See In re Schenck, 870 P.2d 185, 207 (Or. 1994). 
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that judges do not violate their judicial oath and allowing judges suffi-
cient autonomy and independence. 
Walking the tight rope between accountability and independence de-
mands that the National Judicial Council refrain from second-guessing 
judges and reading unnecessary meaning into wrong decisions. There 
exists, however, the fear in some quarters that the National Judicial 
Council, in its enthusiasm to respond to public demands for judicial pro-
bity, may act in ways that compromise judicial independence and stifle 
creativity.259 Some judges worry that the Council may mistake misunder-
standing of the law for corruption.260 The National Judicial Council must 
be careful not to equate misreading of the law with corruption.261 The 
nature of the adjudication process is that judges sometimes reach wrong 
conclusions or misinterpret the law. Erroneous or incorrect decisions are 
not necessarily the result of corruption and should not form the basis for 
sanctions by the Council.262 Judges should always be free to state their 
good faith understanding of the law without fear of sanctions or reper-
                                                                                                             
 259. As part of the research for this project, I interviewed some judges across Nigeria 
who for understandable reasons did not want their identities to be revealed. 
 260. According to one of the judges I interviewed “that is why we have appeal courts. 
The National Judicial Council should not involve itself in matters that are best left to the 
appeal courts to resolve. The fact that a judge made a decision other judges would have 
made differently should not be prima facie evidence of corruption or abuse of office.”  
Some of the judges I interviewed cite the case of Justice Solomon Hun Ponu who was 
dragged before the National Judicial Council for prematurely signing a warrant of posses-
sion before the expiration of the three day statutory period. No allegation of impropriety 
was leveled against the judge but the complainants preferred to report the judge to the 
National Judicial Council. The judge ultimately resigned from the bench after a pro-
tracted investigation by the National Judicial Council, apparently to save himself from 
further embarrassment. 
 261. Cynthia Gray, The Line Between Legal Errors and Judicial Misconduct: Balanc-
ing Judicial Independence and Accountability, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1245, 1246–47 
(2004) (“[I]t is not unethical to be imperfect, and it would be unfair to sanction a judge 
for not being infallible while making hundreds of decisions often under pressure.”). 
 262. I do not argue that errors of judgment should never be the basis for sanctions 
against judges. Persistent errors and errors motivated by bad faith may very well be a 
violation of the Code of Conduct, which enjoins judicial officers to “respect and comply 
with the laws of the land . . . .” See CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS R. 1 
(1998) (Nigeria), http://www.nigeria-law.org/CodeOfConductForJudicialOfficers.htm. 
See also In Re Quirk, 705 So. 2d 172, 180–81 (La. 1997) (“[A] judge may be found to 
have violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by a legal ruling or action made contrary to 
clear and determined law about which there is no confusion or question as to its interpre-
tation and where this legal error was egregious, made in bad faith, or made as part of a 
pattern or practice of legal error.”). For an examination of cases where decisional errors 
were held to constitute judicial misconduct, see generally Gray, supra note 261. 
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cussions. The prospect of dragging judges before the National Judicial 
Council for decisional errors will undermine judicial independence and 
drive judges to become timid and less creative in their reasoning.263 Er-
roneous or incorrect decisions are typically corrected by appeals.264 Dis-
ciplinary mechanisms should be limited to violations of the Code of 
Conduct for Judicial Officers and criminal offenses.265 The “judicial dis-
ciplinary process should not be used as a substitute for appeal.”266 The 
National Judicial Council must be careful not to allow unsatisfied liti-
gants and mischievous lawyers to use the judicial disciplinary process to 
harass and intimidate judges. Judges may be loathe to engage in creative 
judging for fear of being accused of corruption and hence susceptible to 
career ending sanctions and the accompanying public disgrace and hu-
miliation.267 
                                                                                                             
 263. Lubet, supra note 257, at 59 (arguing that “judicial independence is most gravely 
threatened when judges face sanctions . . . based on the merits of a ruling”). 
 264. KATE MALLESON, THE NEW JUDICIARY: THE EFFECTS OF EXPANSION AND 
ACTIVISM 39 (1999) (“The appeal process is an internal mechanism by which judges 
review the decisions of other judges. Its purpose is to maintain consistency and accuracy 
in the law, both substantive and procedural. It does not incorporate any element of exter-
nal accountability which could link the judiciary to the electoral process and applies only 
to errors which are determined by the courts themselves to be appealable.”). 
 265. See Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25 (discussing the disciplinary activities of the 
Judicial Council). 
 266. JEFFREY M. SHARMAN, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT STATE, GOVERNANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY DIVISION 
JUDICIAL REFORM ROUNDTABLE II, JUDICIAL ETHICS: INDEPENDENCE, IMPARTIALITY, AND 
INTEGRITY 8–9 (May 19–22, 1996), http://www.idlo.int/texts/IDLO/mis6379.pdf (“The 
preservation of judicial independence requires that a judge not be subject to disciplinary 
action under the Code merely because the judge may have made an incorrect ruling. An 
independent judge is one who is able to rule according to his or her conscience without 
fear of jeopardy or sanction. So long as judicial rulings are made in good faith and in an 
effort to follow the law, as the judge understands it, the usual safeguard against legal 
error is appellate review.”). See also Randy J. Holland & Cynthia Gray, Judicial Disci-
pline: Independence with Accountability, 5 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 117, 129 (2000) (“an 
erroneous legal ruling that is made in good faith is not unethical judicial conduct; correct-
ing legal errors is the role of the appellate court, not the state judicial conduct organiza-
tions.”). The admonition of the United States Supreme Court in Pierson v. Ray, should 
find support in Nigeria: “[A judge’s] errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not 
have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or 
corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and 
fearless decision making, but to intimidation.”  Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). 
 267. See Lubet, supra note 257 (arguing that judicial independence may be compro-
mised by fear of decisional sanctions). 
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The best way to shield judges from baseless allegations and the atten-
dant obloquy and social stigma is for the National Judicial Council to 
conduct initial investigations into allegations of impropriety without pub-
licly disclosing either the target of the investigation or the allegations.268 
The need for confidentiality during the investigatory stages is especially 
important to protect all the participants including judges and complain-
ants, as well as the judicial system as a whole, from unnecessary obloquy 
should the allegations turn out to be without merit.269 The publicity that 
typically accompanies accusations of judicial impropriety makes it diffi-
cult for a judge who goes through the disciplinary process to regain his 
integrity and respect in society. 
Discussions with some judges and senior members of the bar reveal 
that some of the allegations against judges are baseless, filed in most 
                                                                                                             
 268. Disciplinary proceedings against judicial officers in most states in the United 
States remain confidential during the initial stages, especially during the screening and 
investigatory stages. See Keith, supra note 45, at 1401 (“[M]ost states recognize that 
some level of confidentiality in the process of investigating judicial misconduct protects 
not only the participants—complainants and judges alike—but the judicial system as 
well.”). 
 269. Bryan E. Keyt, Reconciling the Need for Confidentiality in Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceeding with the First Amendment: A Justification Based Analysis, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 959, 966 (1994) (“[T]he primary argument asserted in support of confidentiality 
protection, at least through stage one of the proceedings, is the desire to protect the judi-
ciary from frivolous and unfounded complaints that may damage the reputation and inde-
pendence of the judicial branch.”); Brian R. Pitney, Note, Unlocking the Chamber Door: 
Limiting Confidentiality in Proceedings Before the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review 
Commission, U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 373 (1992) (suggesting that confidentiality is neces-
sary “to prevent self-serving complaints from harassing judges with unfounded or vexa-
tious complaints”). The rationale for maintaining confidentiality in judicial disciplinary 
proceedings articulated by the United States Supreme Court will find support in Nigeria: 
The substantial uniformity of the existing state plans suggests that confidential-
ity is perceived as tending to insure the ultimate effectiveness of the judicial re-
view commissions. First, confidentiality is thought to encourage the filing of 
complaints and the willing participation of relevant witnesses by providing pro-
tection against possible retaliation or recrimination. Second, at least until the 
time when the meritorious can be separated from the frivolous complaints, the 
confidentiality of the proceedings protects judges from the injury which might 
result from publication of unexamined and unwarranted complaints. And fi-
nally, it is argued, confidence in the judiciary as an institution is maintained by 
avoiding premature announcement of groundless claims of judicial misconduct 
or disability since it can be assumed that some frivolous complaints will be 
made against judicial officers who rarely can satisfy all contending litigants. 
Landmark Commc’n, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835 (1979) (citations omitted). 
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cases to harass, discredit and intimidate judicial officers.270 The National 
Judicial Council must make conscious efforts to screen out baseless alle-
gations and spare judges the anxiety and humiliation of defending them-
selves against unfounded allegations. Maintaining privacy and confiden-
tiality at the initial stages will ensure that judges are not smeared by 
baseless and false allegations. If the National Judicial Council finds a 
complaint against a judicial officer to be baseless and decides to dismiss 
the case, it should only communicate its findings to the interested parties, 
i.e., the complainants and the target of the investigation. The complaint, 
including all the allegations and the correspondence between the Council 
and the parties, should remain confidential and must not be disclosed to 
the public. Allegations and the identity of the target of investigation 
should only be made public if the National Judicial Council finds that a 
prima facie case exists to warrant launching a full-scale inquiry.271 
C. Continuing Judicial Education 
For a fairly long time, continuing judicial education was not considered 
a priority for judges in Nigeria.272 New judges did not have orientation or 
training programs and older judges embarked on educational activities 
without any meaningful assistance from the state.273 It was assumed that 
their background either as practicing lawyers or magistrates adequately 
prepared them to serve as judges.274 This assumption over the years has 
                                                                                                             
 270. This was disclosed to me during a private interview with a retired Justice of the 
Court of Appeal and a retired Justice of the Supreme Court who also served as a member 
of the National Judicial Council. 
 271. In most states in America, judicial proceedings are made public after the filing of 
a formal charge. See CYNTHIA GRAY, HANDBOOK FOR MEMBERS OF STATE JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT COMMISSION 71 (1999). 
 272. For a discussion of the events that culminated in the establishment of the National 
Judicial Institute, see NAT’L JUD. INST., FROM CONTINUING EDUCATION TO A NATIONAL 
JUDICIAL INSTITUTE (1993). 
 273. Justice Mohammed Bello, then Chief Justice of Nigeria, stated: 
While in the past, members of the Judiciary, particularly judicial officers have 
pursued their self-development unaided by government, it is time, in our view, 
in the interest of the Judiciary . . . [to] provide proper forum for the intellectual 
development necessary for the proper administration of justice in this country. 
Mohammed Bello, Chief Justice of Nigeria, Opening Address at the Continuing Educa-
tion Induction Program for the Judiciary (May 15, 1989), in NAT’L JUD. INST., supra note 
272, at 37. 
 274. See MALLESON, supra note 264, at 180 n.3 (quoting Professor Zander: “[T]he 
assumption is that by the time a person is appointed as a judge he has knocked around the 
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proven unrealistic, and even fallacious. New and even experienced 
judges often find themselves resolving issues and matters that are com-
pletely new and foreign to their areas of expertise.275 The complexity of 
legal controversies and the passage of new laws present challenges that 
judges may not be well equipped to handle without the benefit of educa-
tion programs.276 Moreover, judges recruited from the legal academy 
without significant experience in legal practice need continuing judicial 
education to familiarize themselves with the practice and procedure of 
the judiciary.277 
                                                                                                             
system for so long that he can be expected to know enough about it to function effec-
tively.’”). 
 275. Making a case for the need for continuing judicial education, Jeffery Sharman 
stated: 
It is necessary for both new and experienced judges to study substantive legal 
topics . . . . First, it is important to keep abreast of recent developments in the 
law, and secondly, it is needed to master areas of the law in which they have lit-
tle or no experience. The judge who has spent most of his or her previous ca-
reer as a lawyer may have little or virtually no knowledge of many legal mat-
ters which will have to be faced as a judge . . . . Thus, there is a need—and a 
continuing one at that—on the part of judges to learn about substantive legal 
topics . . . . [W]hile judges can be expected to have studied the rules of evi-
dence, civil procedure and criminal procedure as students in law school, they 
may have had little practical experience with those matters in their years as at-
torneys. And the vast majority of persons appointed or elected to be judges 
have not previously studied judicial administration or judicial ethics. So, there 
is a strong need to teach these subjects as part of judicial education programs. 
SHARMAN, supra note 266, at 14–15. 
 276. Retired Supreme Court Justice Oputa stated: 
[T]he judge has an obligation to improve his competence in the performance of 
his duties by improving his intellectual ability and widening his knowledge, 
ability and experience of people and of the law. He should know the principles 
of the law which he applies and should know the Rules of Procedure in crimi-
nal and civil causes and matters. A virile and learned Bar has nothing but con-
cealed contempt for an incompetent judge, so also the public at large. Our 
judges should, therefore, keep themselves up to date by continuous reading and 
be kept up to date by a well scheduled program of Continuing Legal Education. 
Oputa, supra note 100, at 203. 
 277. Judges in Nigeria are recruited mostly from the practicing bar and the magistracy. 
See ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 2001, supra note 3, at xlii. Justice M.A. Ope 
Agbe, the then Administrator of the National Judicial Institute explained the rationale 
behind continuing education program for judges: “[T]hese judicial officers are usually 
appointed from private legal practitioners, lawyers in the ministries of justice, academi-
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It is widely accepted by scholars and jurists that continuing judicial 
education is vital to the development of a professional, honest and inde-
pendent judiciary.278 In 1991, Nigeria joined the ranks of countries that 
provide formal continuing legal education tailored specifically to address 
the educational needs of the judiciary by establishing the National Judi-
cial Institute.279 The National Judicial Institute consists of members 
drawn mainly from retired judges, mostly of the Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal.280 The functions and objectives of the National Judicial 
Institute are to: 
[C]onduct courses for all categories of judicial officers and their sup-
porting staff with a view to expanding and improving their overall 
knowledge and performance in their different sections of service; 
[P]rovide continuing education for all categories of judicial officers by 
undertaking, organizing, conducting and facilitating study courses, lec-
tures, seminars, workshops, conferences, and other programs related to 
judicial education.281 
The National Judicial Institute organizes orientation programs for 
newly appointed judges and provides periodic seminars, workshops and 
conferences throughout the country.282 The educational programs cover a 
wide range of issues considered important for judges.283 The proceed-
                                                                                                             
cians and lower courts. On appointment to the higher bench, they need new orientation to 
fit into their new roles as judges of the higher bench.”  Id. 
 278. J. Clifford Wallace, Globalization of Judicial Education, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 355, 
356 (2003) (“[J]udicial education and training programs are of vital importance in mak-
ing judiciaries effective and in providing the structures for achieving the rule of law.”). In 
some states in the United States of America, continuing education for judges is manda-
tory. For example, in Colorado, state judges must complete a required number of continu-
ing legal education hours within a three year period. COLO. R. CIV. P. 260.2(1) (requiring 
all states judges to complete 45 units of CLE during each three year period). 
 279. National Judicial Institute Decree No. 28 (1991) 32:78 O.G., A163 (Nigeria), 
reprinted in NAT’L JUD. INST., supra note 272, at 51. 
 280. Id. § 2(3). 
 281. Id. § 3(2)(a), (b). 
 282. NAT’L JUD. INST., supra note 272, at 10–12; see National Judicial Institute Decree 
No. 28 (1991) 32:78 O.G., A163 § 2(2)(b) (Nigeria). 
 283. For example, topics presented at orientation courses for newly appointed judges 
include constitutional and administrative law, civil and criminal procedure, approach to 
and style of judgment writing, evidence, judicial ethics and concepts of justice. NAT’L 
JUD. INST., supra note 272, at 32. 
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ings, including papers and lectures, are published and widely circulated 
in Nigeria.284 
Thus, the National Judicial Institute has significantly and positively af-
fected the overall performance of the judiciary.285 By organizing semi-
nars, conferences, and workshops, judges have been provided with an 
enhanced understanding and greater appreciation of the ethical and intel-
lectual underpinnings of their positions.286 Scholarships and lectures pro-
duced under the aegis of the National Judicial Institute help judges to 
ponder and reflect on their position and the best way to approach their 
role as adjudicators.287 
Another major focus of continuing legal education is judicial ethics.288 
Prior to 1993, there was no formal code of ethics for judges.289 Judicial 
officers relied on their friends or their intuitive sense of right and wrong 
to resolve ethical dilemmas. Reliance on one’s intuitive sense of right 
and wrong can prove unsatisfactory. As lawyers assume new roles as 
judges, “it is even more important that the judge be guided by express 
standards of ethical conduct rather than rely upon his or her innate com-
mon sense.”290 The demand for express standards of ethical conduct for 
judges culminated in the adoption of a formal Code of Conduct for Judi-
cial Officers in 1998.291 The Code emphatically states, “Violation of any 
of the rules contained in this Code shall constitute judicial misconduct or 
                                                                                                             
 284. See, e.g., ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 2001, supra note 3; 1999 ALL 
NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE, supra note 2. 
 285. For the achievements of the National Judicial Institute, see Tobi, supra note 209, 
at 33–34. 
 286. The National Judicial Institute also collaborates with other bodies and non-
governmental organizations to organize workshops and seminars for judicial officers. For 
example, the National Judicial Institute and the Nigerian Communications Commission 
recently organized a training on legal issues relating to telecommunications for judges. 
Commission Holds Workshop for Judges, NEWSLETTER (Nig. Commc’ns Comm’n, 
Abuja, Nigeria), Jan./Feb. 2005, http://www.ncc.gov.ng/newsletter/2005/JanuaryFebru-
ary_Edition.pdf. 
 287. C.O. Okonkwo, A Historical Overview of Legal Education in Nigeria, in LEGAL 
EDUCATION FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY NIGERIA 26 (I.A. Ayua & D.A. Guobadia eds., 
2000) (“Already members of the Bench, especially newly appointed judges, seem to be 
deriving immense benefit from the activities of the Institute.”). 
 288. For a discussion on judicial ethics in Nigeria, see Oputa, supra note 276, at 193. 
 289. See AKINBIYI, supra note 105, at 202. 
 290. Wayne Mackay, Judicial Ethics: Exploring Misconduct and Accountability for 
Judges 4 (June 1995), available at http://www.dal.ca/~cjei/mackay.html (unpublished 
manuscript). 
 291. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS (1998) (Nigeria), http://www.nigeria 
law.org/CodeOfConductForJudicialOfficers.htm. 
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misbehavior and may entail disciplinary action.”292 The Code serves as a 
useful source of information and guidance on the scope and limits of 
permissible judicial behavior.293 It provides definite instructions on what 
constitutes judicial impropriety.294 A judge’s conduct, whether in or out-
side the courtroom, affects the integrity of the judicial process as well as 
public confidence in the system of justice. The Code, therefore, admon-
ishes a judicial officer to “avoid impropriety and the appearance of im-
propriety in all his activities.”295 It further states that a judicial officer 
“should respect and comply with the laws of the land and should conduct 
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the Judiciary.”296 The Code covers off-the-
bench as well as on-the-bench conduct of judicial officers. It offers guid-
ance and suggestions to judicial officers on how to handle their adjudica-
tive duties,297 administrative duties,298 avocational activities,299 civil and 
charitable activities300 and business and financial activities.301 
The moral fervor of the Code of judicial ethics can be reinforced by 
continuing judicial education programs.302 Through lectures, seminars 
                                                                                                             
 292. Id. Explanations (iii). 
 293. Recent Developments: Developing Judicial Code of Ethics, 46 J. AFR. L. 103, 111 
(2002). Extolling the adoption of judicial codes of ethics, the journal stated, “To help 
retain the sensitive balance between independence and accountability, it is becoming 
increasingly common for states to develop a code of judicial ethics. Such a document is 
extremely desirable as a means of establishing the parameters for public expectations and 
criticisms of judicial conduct.”  Id. 
 294. Mackay, supra note 290, at 10 (“[A] code of judicial ethics can provide a base for 
judges to assess their behavior. It can provide a map (be it ever so general) in a largely 
uncharted sea.”). 
 295. CODE OF CONDUCT FOR JUDICIAL OFFICERS R. 1(1) (1998) (Nigeria), http://www. 
nigerialaw.org/CodeOfConductForJudicialOfficers.htm. 
 296. Id. R. 1(1). 
 297. Id. R. 2. 
 298. Id. R. 2(b). 
 299. Id. R. 3(a). 
 300. Id. R. 3(b). 
 301. Id. R. 3(e). 
 302. The benefits of continuing judicial education were stated by Professor Markey, 
former Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit, and former Chair of the 
Advisory Committee of Code of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States 
as follows: 
[S]eminars in judicial ethics would benefit judges in two ways. First, seminars 
would educate judges in the rules of judicial ethics and their application. Sec-
ond, seminars would allow judges to exchange their thoughts on and experience 
with ethical issues. Education in the rules and their application would arm the 
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and publications, the National Judicial Institute seeks to educate, moti-
vate and challenge judges to observe the ethical standards contained in 
the Code of Conduct for Judicial Officers.303 Without educational pro-
grams that continually stress judicial ethics, even the most aggressive 
disciplinary regime will not be enough to address judicial improprie-
ties.304 For newly appointed judges, the rigors of adjusting to their new 
roles as judges will be significantly reduced by educational programs that 
sensitize judges to the ethical standards of the judiciary.305 Judges often 
need guidance to overcome the challenges posed by judging in a corrupt 
environment. The guidance needed to overcome the temptations faced by 
judges can come from training and education. 
The activities of the National Judicial Institute, especially programs 
and seminars on judicial ethics, reflect a commendable appreciation of 
the need to focus on preventive and prophylactic measures that reduce 
incidents of judicial impropriety as opposed to the after-the-fact reactive 
responses that underlie the efforts of the National Judicial Council.306 
Only by supplementing sanctions with educational programs that address 
the underlying causes of corruption will Nigeria achieve the desired goal 
of eliminating judicial corruption.307 It is therefore very important that 
the National Judicial Institute, acting in conjunction with the National 
Judicial Council, continue to provide guidance to judges on the scope 
and limits of acceptable judicial behavior and offer suggestions that will 
                                                                                                             
judges with knowledge of the rules and would make colleagues available as re-
sources for judges who are faced with ethical issues. 
Howard T. Markey, A Need for Continuing Education in Judicial Ethics, 28 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 647, 649 (1994). 
 303. Id. 
 304. Sanctions are often inadequate to deal with the underlying factors that lead to 
corruption. See Michael Kirby, Justice of the High Court of Australia, The St. James 
Ethics Centre, Living Ethics, Tackling Judicial Corruption—Globally, http://www. 
hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/kirbyj_stjames.htm  (“[I]nternational treaties, supported by 
local laws, increasingly impose sanctions on those who set out to corrupt the vulnerable. 
[Transparency International] teaches that putting corrupt officials behind bars is not 
enough. The solutions must be systemic. The basic causes must be addressed.”). 
 305. See Cynthia Gray & Frances Kahn Zemans, Instructing Judges: Ethical Experi-
ence and Educational Technique, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 305–06 (1995) (argu-
ing for ethics training for judges). 
 306. The National Judicial Council only steps in after a judicial officer allegedly en-
gages in judicial misconduct. See Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25. 
 307. See Gray & Zemans, supra note 305. 
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help judges resolve ethical dilemmas involved in presiding over trials in 
a developing society with slacking moral values.308 
Besides instruction in ethics, the National Judicial Institute will help in 
equipping judges with the tools and education they need to effectively 
cope with judging in a rapidly developing and politically unstable coun-
try.309 New laws are frequently passed to assist in the transformation of 
the country. It will be very helpful if the judges who interpret these laws 
are exposed to continuing judicial education that will better equip them 
to handle the task.310 In addition, as litigation becomes increasingly com-
plex and lawyers attain greater proficiency and sophistication as a result 
of technological advancements in society, it is essential that judges be 
trained to cope with or match the expertise of lawyers.311 
D. Independence of the Judiciary 
The Nigerian judiciary continues to face problems due in large meas-
ure to the legacy of military rule. The military’s disdain for due process 
led to attempts to manipulate the judiciary and turn judges into pliable 
agents of state power.312 Years of manipulation of the judiciary culmi-
nated in a compromised judiciary that is unable to engage in dispassion-
ate and impartial adjudication of disputes.313 Despite democratic transi-
tion, the damnable legacy of military rule still thwarts efforts to create a 
virile and independent judiciary. Though flagrant and brazen control of 
the judiciary reminiscent of the military era seems unlikely, the Nigerian 
                                                                                                             
 308. See Markey, supra note 302 (discussing the benefits of continuing judicial educa-
tion to judges). 
 309. For a discussion of the role of judges in developing societies, see Oko, supra note 
192, at 625–29. 
 310. SHARMAN, supra note 266, § III.E. 
 311. Thomas M. Nickel, Judges Deserve Access to Educational Opportunities, 49 FED. 
LAWYER, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 56 (arguing that seminars that expose judges to cutting edge 
issues make for a robust and healthy judiciary). 
 312. Agbede, supra note 146, at 144. 
 313. Agbede describes the effect the military regime has had on the judiciary: 
Of all the excesses of the military regime the most intolerable is the undeclared 
control they exercise over the judiciary . . . . The sheer intimidating posture of 
the military regime (with unrestrained power) towards the judges who have to 
depend on the same regime for the enforcement of their judgment is itself dis-
arming. Their behind-the-scene overtures can hardly be resisted by the average 
judge let alone their overt acts of intimidation. 
Id. 
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judiciary continues to confront government functionaries who are invet-
erately uneasy about the notion of an independent judiciary.314 
A legal framework exists for the independence of the judiciary in Nige-
ria.315 Judges enjoy security of tenure and once appointed serve until they 
attain the retirement age.316 They are appointed through a process that is 
relatively immune from politics.317 The executive cannot initiate removal 
or disciplinary proceedings against judges.318 Also, the Constitution pro-
                                                                                                             
 314. Government officials view the judiciary as vital to their power base and therefore 
engage in all kinds of machinations to turn the judiciary into malleable instruments of 
state power. The dominant government attitude towards the judiciary was eloquently 
stated by Petter Langseth, a crime prevention officer with the United Nations Center for 
International Crime Prevention, “One has to understand the political resistance to judicial 
independence as the result of the unwillingness of the executive and legislature to let go 
of a court system frequently used as a tool to settle political scores or to consolidate po-
litical bases.”  Petter Langseth, Empowering the Victims of Corruption Through Social 
Control Mechanisms 21, paper presented at IACC’s Meeting in Prague (Oct. 9, 2001), 
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/gpacpublications/cicp17.pdf. 
 315. Several international bodies and organizations have articulated and defined the 
principles that undergird the independence of the judiciary. See, e.g., IBA MINIMUM 
STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (Int’l Bar Ass’n 1982), reprinted in JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE, supra note 57; High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary ¶ 2, welcomed by 
the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/RES/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/indjudiciary.htm; First World Conference on the Inde-
pendence of Justice, Montreal, June 10, 1983, Universal Declaration on the Independ-
ence of Justice (1983), reprinted in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE  447 (Shetreet & Deschênes 
eds., 1985). 
 316. Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal may retire at the age of 
sixty-five and shall cease to hold office when they attain the age of seventy. 
CONSTITUTION, art. 291(1) (1999) (Nigeria). Other judges may retire at sixty but must 
cease to hold office at sixty-five. Id. art. 291(2). 
 317. The Chief Justice of Nigeria and the Justices of the Supreme Court are appointed 
by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to con-
firmation by the Senate. Id. art. 231(1), (2). The President of the Court of Appeal is ap-
pointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject 
to confirmation by the Senate. Id. art. 238(1). Other justices of the Court of Appeal are 
appointed by the President on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council. Id. 
art. 238(2). The Chief Judge of the Federal High Court is appointed by the President on 
the recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation by the Sen-
ate. Id. art. 250(1). At the state level, the Chief Judge is appointed by the Governor on the 
recommendation of the National Judicial Council subject to confirmation by the House of 
Assembly of the State. Id. art. 271(1). Other state high court judges are appointed by the 
state governors on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council. Id. art. 271(2). 
 318. Under the Constitution of Nigeria: 
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vides that remuneration and salaries payable to judges and their condi-
tions of service shall not be altered to their disadvantage.319 
In practice, however, judicial independence remains extremely fragile, 
implacably assaulted by politicians and corrupt judges. Though the Nige-
rian Constitution maintains a clear separation of powers between the ex-
ecutive and the judiciary, it is illusory to assume that politicians will re-
frain from interfering with the judiciary simply because of the Constitu-
tion. The experience in Nigeria reveals that intolerance, contempt for the 
judiciary and the desire to control and manipulate the judiciary continu-
ally swirl within the executive.320 Elected officials and politicians often 
push or prod judges to forfeit their impartiality and independence.321 The 
judiciary, on its part, has some judges who either lack or fail to demon-
                                                                                                             
A judicial officer shall not be removed from his office or appointment before 
his age of retirement except in the following circumstances— 
  (a) in the case of— 
   (i) Chief Justice of Nigeria, President of the Court of Appeal, Chief Judge 
of the Federal High Court, Chief Judge of the High Court of the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja, Grand Kadi of the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal 
Capital Territory, Abuja and President, Customary Court of Appeal of the Fed-
eral Capital Territory, Abuja, by the President acting on an address supported 
by two-thirds majority of the Senate. 
   (ii) Chief Judge of a State, Grand Kadi of a Sharia Court of Appeal or 
President of a Customary Court of Appeal of a State, by the Governor acting on 
an address supported by two-thirds majority of the House of Assembly of the 
State, [sic] praying that he be so removed for his inability to discharge the func-
tions of his office or appointment (whether arising from infirmity of mind or of 
body) or for misconduct or contravention of the Code of Conduct; 
  (b) in any case, other than those to which paragraph (a) of this subsection 
applies, by the President or, as the case may be, the Governor acting on the rec-
ommendation of the National Judicial Council that the judicial officer be so 
removed for his inability to discharge the functions of his office or appointment 
(whether arising from infirmity of mind or of body) or for misconduct or con-
travention of the Code of Conduct. 
Id. art. 292(1). 
 319. CONSTITUTION, art. 84(3)–(4) (1999) (Nigeria). In addition, judges are guaranteed 
a pension upon retirement. Id. art. 291(3)(c). 
 320. Government officials exploit the appointive powers and control over the funds 
allocated to the judiciary to prod judges to bow to their wishes. See NWABUEZE, supra 
note 133. 
 321. Id. 
2005] SEEKING JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 73 
 
strate the integrity needed to resist pressures and overtures on them to 
deviate from acceptable judicial behavior.322 
Nigerians have come to realize that it is the attitude of the executive 
and its willingness to respect the integrity of the judicial process and re-
frain from interfering with the judiciary that nurtures the independence of 
the judiciary rather than constitutional provisions and self-serving decla-
rations by politicians.323 In a system where judges are fearful of the ex-
ecutive, it is futile to expect them to exercise the level of independence 
needed for them to engage in impartial and dispassionate resolution of 
conflicts.324 The climate of intimidation, manipulation and control of the 
judiciary by the executive often forces judges to engage in a cost-benefit 
analysis with potentially disastrous consequences for the integrity and 
independence of the judiciary.325 Judges have to choose between com-
mitment to justice and risking the ire of the executive or demonstrating 
their fealty to the executive. Most judges have succumbed to the notion 
                                                                                                             
 322. See J.A. Ajakaiye, The Constitutional Role of the National Judicial Council With 
Regard to Collection and Disbursement of Funds to the Judiciaries: Problems and Pros-
pects, in ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 2001, supra note 3, at 127, 136. A report 
produced by the Constitutional Conference of 1994–95 painted a picture of the relation-
ship between the executive and the judiciary that remains true in contemporary Nigeria. 
Id. The report concluded: 
The universal principle of separation of powers between the three arms of gov-
ernment, namely: the executive, legislature and the judiciary, appears not to be 
in operation in Nigeria at the federal and state levels, particularly with refer-
ence to the judiciary. The judiciary in Nigeria is tied to the apron string of the 
executive, both at the federal and state levels and this erodes the independence 
of the judiciary. In other words, the judiciary in Nigeria is so dependent on the 
executive that it is regarded as an extension of the executive. 
Id. (quoting the Report of the Constitutional Conference of 1994–95). As rightly pointed 
out by Professor Yakubu, “What is missing to make the independence of the judiciary 
complete under our constitution is the maturity, confidence, personal integrity, will of 
power and mind, and the ability to resist taking sides.”  A. A. Olowofoyeku, The Belea-
guered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of Nigeria’s Judiciary, 33 J. AFR. L. 55, 
67 (1989). 
 323. Independence of the judiciary thrives in established democracies principally be-
cause of the democratic culture and temperament of elected officials who encourage the 
judiciary to function as intended without interference or manipulation. See Hsu, supra 
note 59, at 282. 
 324. See Karibi-Whyte, supra note 138, at 148–52. 
 325. Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REV. 431, 457 (2004) (“If judges are 
not independent, they will be subject to influence that could distort the outcome of cases, 
skew the development of substantive law, and detract from public confidence in the judi-
cial system.”). 
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that career development depends on how they rule, especially in high 
profile cases involving the government.326 Judges cast in this mold prefer 
to demonstrate their loyalty to the executive, sacrificing the dictates of 
justice in an attempt to appease the executive, and thus, maintain their 
viability in the system.327 This explains the lack of independence despite 
the constitutional provisions designed to secure the independence of the 
judiciary.328 
Until Nigeria produces an independent, competent and honest judici-
ary, securing fair trial rights will remain largely unattainable, perhaps 
illusory.329 The imperatives of judicial independence dictate that judges 
be “protected in their decision-making from interference by the state and 
all other influences that may affect their impartiality.”330 Judicial inde-
pendence does not exist solely for the protection of judges; it is necessary 
for the good of the public and the system of government.331 The public 
                                                                                                             
 326. This was disclosed to me during an interview with a retired Justice of the Court of 
Appeal. 
 327. See Agbede, supra note 146, at 143. 
 328. In 1989, Justice Mohammed Uwais, then Chief Justice of Nigeria, in a paper enti-
tled The Structure and Position of the Judiciary, admonished judges to assert their inde-
pendence and refrain from kowtowing to the executive. He stated: 
. . . the heads of the Judiciary and the Judges themselves are too timid to exer-
cise their new found independence. They sheepishly follow whatever the Ex-
ecutive decide for the Civil Service as if the Judiciary is still part of the Civil 
Service. There is no doubt that the time has come when the Judiciary should be 
seen to exert its administrative independence . . . . The burden is on the shoul-
ders of the Executive heads of the Judiciary and indeed the Judges collectively. 
Olayiwola Aderemi, The Role of a Judge in the Administration of Justice in Nigeria, in 
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN NIGERIA 97 (AdemolaYakubu ed., 2000). 
 329. See Jerome J. Shestack, Commentary, The Risks to Judicial Independence, 84 
A.B.A. J. 8 (1998) (“[A]n independent judiciary is the measure of an effective separation 
of powers in our democracy. It stands as the ultimate protector of our constitutional rights 
and liberties against the power of the executive or the will of the legislature. It is the 
foundation that underlies a rule of law.”); Michael G. Collins, Judicial Independence and 
Scope of Article III—A View From the Federalist, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 675, 687 (2004) 
(“The dual functions of judicial independence as an aid in securing enforcement of the 
Constitution on the one hand, and the impartial enforcement of ordinary rights on the 
other, is a frequent theme of The Federalist No. 78.”). 
 330. MALLESON, supra note 264, at 64 (quoting Sir Ninian Stephen). 
 331. There exists a broad consensus among jurists and scholars that judicial independ-
ence is vital to the efficiency and effectiveness of the judiciary. Janet Stidman Eveleth 
has written: 
Judicial independence is the cornerstone of our rule of law and it is also signifi-
cant for citizens. It means that when any citizen appears before a court of law, 
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will never have confidence in a judiciary that is either manipulated by or 
afraid of the executive.332 
Judicial independence insulates judges from external pressures and al-
lows “a judicial officer in exercising the authority vested in him . . . to 
act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal conse-
quences to himself.”333 For judicial independence to deepen, more efforts 
should be expended in helping elected officials and the general public to 
understand that judicial independence is not just for the benefit of indi-
vidual judges.334 The judiciary will never be truly independent if elected 
                                                                                                             
his or her case will be decided on its merits. Impartial judges, governed only by 
our rule of law, apply the law fairly to all citizens and shield them from politi-
cians, government, businesses and each other. They protect the individual 
rights of all Americans and ensure they are treated equally and fairly. An inde-
pendent judiciary enables citizens to enjoy liberties and freedoms guaranteed 
under the Constitution. 
Janet Stidman Eveleth, Preserving Our Judicial Independence, 37 MD. B.J. 58, 62 
(2004). The Chief Justice of Canada, extolling the values of judicial independence, 
stated: 
Judicial independence is valued because it serves important societal goals—it is 
a means to secure those goals. One of these goals is the maintenance of public 
confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary, which is essential to the effec-
tiveness of the court system. Independence contributes to the perception that 
justice will be done in individual cases. Another social goal served by judicial 
independence is the maintenance of the rule of law, one aspect of which is the 
constitutional principle that the exercise of all public power must find its ulti-
mate source in a legal rule. 
Re Provincial Court Judges, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3. 
 332. Gleeson, supra note 55. Stressing the need for an independent judiciary, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer stated: 
The good that proper adjudication can do for the justice and stability of a coun-
try is only attainable, however, if judges actually decide according to law, and 
are perceived by everyone around them to be deciding according to law, rather 
than according to their own whim or caprice or in compliance with the will of 
powerful political actors. Judicial independence provides the organizing con-
cept within which we think about and develop those institutional assurances 
that allow judges to fulfill this important social role. 
Stephen G. Breyer, Judicial Independence in the United States, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 989, 
996 (1996); Chief Justice Rehnquist also described an independent judiciary as “one of 
the crown jewels of our system of government today.”  Symposium, The Future of the 
Federal Courts, 46 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 263, 274 (1996). 
 333. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871). 
 334. In the final analysis, judicial independence inures to the benefit of the society, 
especially those who lack the resources to protect their rights. See W.F. Rylaarsdam, 
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officials do not check the impulse to manipulate and intimidate judges.335 
Elected officials’ commitment to the independence of the judiciary must 
go beyond mere symbolism. Political elites cannot continue to masquer-
ade as defenders of judicial independence while striving fervently to in-
terfere with, intimidate and manipulate the judiciary. Lawyers must con-
vince the often antagonistic executives that hopes of deepening democ-
racy cannot be realized without a strong and independent judiciary. Once 
elected officials are persuaded to appreciate the role and place of the ju-
diciary and how the judiciary can bring about stability, they will be more 
likely to allow the judiciary to function without interference. Also, the 
public will join the struggle for judicial independence once they are reas-
sured that the prospects of securing fair trial rights lies in the quality of 
the judiciary.336 
E. Funding 
Prospects of establishing an independent judiciary will be further en-
dangered if judges depend on the goodwill of the executive branch for 
their funding.337 It is a continuing source of frustration to judges that 
money allocated to the judiciary is controlled by the executive.338 Ex-
                                                                                                             
Judicial Independence—A Value Worth Protecting, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1653, 1655 (1993) 
(“Judicial independence is hardly needed to protect the interest of the powerful, the po-
litically well-connected, or the interests of the majority. Like free speech, its only value 
lies in protecting the unpopular, the disliked, and the others outside the mainstream.”). 
 335. No one could seriously argue with the Chief Justice of Nigeria who stated that 
“[t]he independence of the judiciary can only be sustained and guaranteed when there is 
no interference by the other arms of the government or their agencies in the discharge of 
its duties.”  Uwais, supra note 3, at xxxi. 
 336. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Courtroom With a View: Building Judicial Independence 
With Public Participation, 8 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 13, 24 (2000) (“The 
public’s willingness to support and fight for judicial independence depends on the pub-
lic’s understanding of, and trust and confidence in, the judicial system. A public that does 
not trust its judges to exercise even-handed judgment will look upon judicial independ-
ence as a problem to be eradicated.”). 
 337. See Aduba, supra note 34, at 404 (noting that funding has been one of the most 
difficult problems for the judiciary). 
 338. Chief Justice Uwais, in an address to the All Nigeria Judges’ Conference, empha-
sized the need to grant financial autonomy to the judiciary. He stated: 
The funding of the judiciary is crucial and is a most important index for assess-
ing the independence of the judiciary. Although the 1999 Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria has made special provisions towards funding the 
Nigerian judiciary, those provisions are not free from ambiguity; consequently, 
the application of those provisions by various State Executives is reportedly 
half-hearted. 
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pressing the frustration widely shared by most judges in Nigeria, retired 
President of the Court of Appeal, Justice Akanbi stated, “It is certainly 
no use speaking of the judiciary as the third arm of government if that 
arm has wittingly or unwittingly been consigned to the role of beggar, 
living at the mercy of the other two powerful arms.”339 Premised on the 
need to liberate the judiciary from the clutches of the executive, the calls 
for granting the judiciary control over its statutorily allocated funds have 
become louder and more persistent over the years.340 
The Constitution conferred on the judiciary the task of acting as a 
check upon abuse of power and protecting citizens’ rights against gov-
ernmental encroachment.341 It is nonsensical for judges to depend on the 
goodwill of the executive for the funds needed to effectively discharge 
their functions.342 A funding procedure that leaves the judiciary at the 
mercy of the executive hinders the judiciary’s effectiveness and capacity 
to resist executive pressures.343 Potential for interference is great when-
ever the executive controls the funds statutorily allocated to the judici-
ary.344 Both the appearance and reality of independence demand that the 
judiciary should have complete control over its funds.345 
The Constitution Drafting Committee that produced the 1979 Constitu-
tion included a provision in the draft constitution that lessened the judici-
ary’s dependence on the executive for its funding. Section 74(4) of the 
draft constitution provided that: 
                                                                                                             
Uwais, supra note 3, at xxxi. 
 339. Aduba, supra note 34, at 405. 
 340. I.E. SAGAY, LEGACY FOR POSTERITY: THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT (1980–
1988) 55 (1998) (“Many factors contribute to or detract from the achievement of judicial 
independence. Very frequently, various State Chief Judges appeal to the Executive to 
make sufficient funds available in order to make the judiciary a viable arm of Govern-
ment. Connected with this is the call that the funding of the judiciary should be separately 
provided for in the Constitution, in order to enhance their independence. In other words, 
Executive control of judicial purse strings inhibits the independence of the latter.”). 
 341. CONSTITUTION, art. 6 (1999) (Nigeria). 
 342. CEELI, supra note 34, § 4, pt. F (“Constitutional or legislative provisions that the 
judiciary is independent become suspect when the control of the resources essential to 
operation of the judiciary are vested in the executive arm of the government.”). 
 343. SAGAY, supra note 340, at 55. 
 344. See Aduba, supra note 34, at 404. 
 345. Chief Justice Uwais, in an address to the All Nigeria Judges of the Lower Court 
Conference stated that “[j]udicial independence entails not only lack of external interfer-
ence with the judicial function, but also financial autonomy.”  Okon Bassey, Judicial 
Independence, Key to Good Governance, Says Uwais, THIS DAY (Nig.), Nov. 22, 2004. 
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No money shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or 
any other public fund of the Federation except in the manner prescribed 
by the National Assembly. 
Provided that moneys in respect of the Capital and Recurrent Expendi-
ture of the Judicial Service of the Federation charged upon the Consoli-
dated Revenue Fund of the Federation shall be withdrawn from the 
Fund and paid into a special account of the Federation under the control 
of the judiciary of the Federation.346  
This provision was, however, deleted by the then Supreme Military 
Council before signing the Constitution into law.347 Deleting this provi-
sion served and still serves as a further indication of the attitude of the 
executive and elected politicians toward the judiciary.348 It may well be 
time for Nigeria to consider a constitutional amendment to incorporate 
the recommendations of the Constitution Drafting Committee. Several 
scholars and commentators have called for granting the judiciary control 
over its funds.349 History and logic support a constitutional amendment 
that will liberate the judiciary from executives who in the past have 
shown deliberate indifference to or lack of concern for the plight of the 
judiciary.350 It is both appropriate and desirable to allow the judiciary to 
                                                                                                             
 346. Muhammed Mustapha Akanbi, Retired President of the Court of Appeal, Funding 
of the Judiciary, Paper Presented at the 21st Annual Conference of the Magistrates Ass’n 
of Nigeria, in THE JUDICIARY AND THE CHALLENGES OF JUSTICE, supra note 94, at 22, 25. 
 347. Id. 
 348. The 1979 Constitution has been revised two times, in 1989 and 1999. Ema Orji, 
Issues on Ethnicity and Governance in Nigeria: A Universal Human Rights Perspective, 
25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 431, 438 (2001). 
 349. Agbede, supra note 146, at 143 (“In order to be able to perform its role as an un-
biased umpire in cases involving the interest of the government, the judiciary should in 
no way be subordinate to any of the other two organs. It is therefore necessary that the 
judiciary should be made financially independent of the executive.”); SAGAY, supra note 
340, at 55; Ajakaiye, supra note 182, at 136. 
 350. See Constance A.R. Momoh, Commentary, in ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 
2001, supra note 3, at 84. Justice Constance A.R. Momoh, Chief Judge of Edo State, 
aptly described the effect of judiciary’s dependence on the other arms of government for 
its funding: 
Over the years it has become evidently clear that the power of control of the na-
tion’s purse jointly exercised by the other two arms of government has contin-
ued to be used to the detriment of the judiciary. 
The poor funding of the judiciary, both in respect of capital and recurrent ex-
penditure year in year out, bears eloquent testimony to this. The result is that 
unlike what generally operates in the other two arms of government, the work 
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control its funds. Judges will be in a better position to resist attempts by 
the executive to influence them if they control their own funds. 
The dictates of judicial independence and the need to protect judges 
from executive pressures demand that the judiciary have control over its 
funds.351 Granting the judiciary control over its funds will have enormous 
implications both for the independence and the operational efficiency of 
the judiciary.352 Proper funding will enable the judiciary to address struc-
tural and institutional problems that cause delay.353 Infrastructural prob-
lems, including the absence of stenographers and modern tools like com-
puters can all be addressed with adequate funding.354 Control over funds 
will make it possible for the judiciary to channel funds where they are 
most needed, especially in the areas of salaries and working conditions. 
Funding is especially needed to improve the salaries of judges to avoid 
the urge to augment their incomes through corrupt means.355 Poor sala-
                                                                                                             
environment of judicial personnel, especially the judges, their living environ-
ments and remunerations remain very poor. 
Id. at 88. 
 351. It may well be time for the policy makers in Nigeria to give sincere attention to 
the recommendations of the Constitutional Conference empanelled in 1994 by the late 
Dictator Abacha. On the funding of the judiciary, the Conference stated: 
If the Judiciary is to be truly independent, it must have absolute control of its 
finances. Funding of the court system must be made independent of the Execu-
tive. The Judiciary should prepare its own annual budget and defend same. The 
approved budgetary allocation of the judiciary should be disbursed directly to 
the Judiciary as in the case of Local Governments. The Judiciary should have 
its own accounting administration with the Director-General as the Chief Ac-
counting Officer who should be responsible directly to the Chief Justice or 
Head of Superior Courts of Record as the case may be. 
Report of the Constitutional Conference of 1994–95, quoted in Ajakaiye, supra note 182, 
at 136. 
 352. Justice M.A. Ope Agbe, then Administrator of the National Judicial Institute, 
highlighted the deplorable state of the judiciary and the need to adequately fund the judi-
ciary. Welcome Address by the Honourable Administrator, National Judicial Institute, in 
ALL NIGERIA JUDGES’ CONFERENCE 2001, supra note 3, at xli, xlii–xliii (“In the course of 
our going around organizing workshops, we came across a total lack of the tools to en-
able judicial officers do their work . . . . [i]t must however be stated loud and clear that 
without adequate funding, this arm of government would be handicapped in the quest to 
attain good government in the country.”). 
 353. See supra Part II.D for a discussion of the institutional problems that prevent the 
judiciary from efficiently adjudicating disputes. 
 354. See id. 
 355. Wallace, supra note 254, at 350 (remarking that the likelihood of corruption is 
increased when judges are not adequately compensated by the state). 
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ries make it difficult for judges to function efficiently. Some judges, be-
come susceptible to corruption as they seek other means to augment their 
meager incomes.356 Upright judges are often preoccupied with balancing 
financial needs, thus compromising the clarity of mind necessary to 
make for effective legal reasoning.357 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Judicial corruption is a damnable blight on Nigeria’s justice system. A 
judiciary that cannot fairly, efficiently and transparently administer jus-
tice and that allows money and influence to determine the outcome of a 
judicial proceeding is atrocious and offensive to Nigeria’s values and 
democratic order. More importantly, judicial corruption has the obvious 
consequence of alienating the public from, and reducing their confidence 
in, the justice system, and indeed, the democratic process. I have shown 
in this paper that the judiciary must purge itself of corruption and reform 
its practices so that it can better discharge the eminently important task 
of administering justice. I have also shown that the right mix of educa-
tion and sanctions is necessary to recapture the judiciary’s institutional 
commitment to justice, integrity and professionalism. I suggested the 
transformation of existing programs and institutions to enable Nigeria to 
meet the demands and challenges of fair trial.358 
To preserve the right to a fair trial, Nigeria must respond progressively 
and creatively to the problems of the judiciary, especially corruption and 
                                                                                                             
 356. See Olowofoyeku, supra note 322, at 63 (“It is of utmost importance for judicial 
independence that judges should be free from financial anxieties. This is because a judge 
who is subjected to financial anxieties through inadequate or insecure pay might be re-
duced into a state of servility to the authority responsible for his financial fortunes, or 
might succumb to pressures because of financial worries.”). 
 357. See Akanbi, supra note 94, at 46 (“The mind that administers justice must be free 
from financial embarrassment. He must be able to think straight, talk straight, walk 
straight to be able to deliver good judgment. All things being equal, a good judgment 
flows from a mind that is not bogged by the thought of where do I get my next meal or 
where do I get the money to pay my son’s school fees. Poor condition of service disturbs 
the mind. It is an obstacle to clear and positive thinking and consequently, an obstacle to 
justice according to law.”). 
 358. Fair trial rights will truly mean something if the judiciary recaptures its standing 
as fair and impartial umpires. Everyone who goes to court should, according to U.S. Su-
preme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “leave secure in the knowledge that justice is 
open, illuminated, and makes room for everyone, and that in this place facts are deter-
mined correctly, legal issues resolved fairly and wisely, and equal justice under law is 
rendered to all.”  Sandra Day O’Connor, Courthouse Dedication: Justice O’Connor Re-
flects on Arizona’s Judiciary, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001). 
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inadequate funding. The National Judicial Council is trying, with some 
success, to sanitize the judiciary and discipline erring judges.359 Because 
judicial corruption is deep-seated and pervasive, it cannot be eradicated 
immediately and easily. Too many Nigerians are immersed in the culture 
of corruption to allow quick and easy solutions. Combating judicial cor-
ruption requires the sustained efforts of all. Nigerians must find the re-
solve to confront an entrenched culture that encourages corruption and 
interference with the judicial process. Citizens, the ultimate victims of 
judicial corruption, who complain incessantly about judicial corruption, 
have a large stake in reforming the judiciary. Citizens can significantly 
aid the fight against judicial corruption if they refuse to participate in 
corrupt activities and report corrupt judges to the appropriate authori-
ties.360 Efforts to reform the judiciary will not succeed unless the public 
and lawyers with relevant information report it.361 The National Judicial 
Council must redouble its efforts to educate the public on the scope and 
limits of acceptable judicial behavior. Promoting awareness of judicial 
conduct issues “will result in an increased level of integrity among the 
judiciary as well as an enhanced public appreciation of that integrity.”362 
Lawyers should also explain to the public, and especially their clients, 
the rules and procedure for filing complaints against judicial officers.363 
The legal profession’s role in combating judicial corruption will be sig-
nificantly enhanced if the legal profession sanctions its members who 
engage in judicial corruption.364 
                                                                                                             
 359. The National Judicial Council has conducted credible and transparent investiga-
tion in cases where the facts warrant an inquiry into the conduct of a judicial officer. 
Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25, at 18. 
 360. See ArabicNews.com, The Costs of Corruption to Citizens is Very High, 
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/050806/2005080625.html (last visited 
Aug. 26, 2005); Josephine Lohor, Obasanjo Ups the Ante Against Corruption, THIS DAY 
(Nig.), Aug. 7, 2005. 
 361. The National Judicial Council only acts upon credible evidence of wrongdoing 
against a judge. See Nnaemeka-Agu, supra note 25, at 18 (“The National Judicial Council 
does not go about fishing for offending Judicial officers. It must first receive a report of 
wrongdoing.”). 
 362. Keith, supra note 45, at 1405. 
 363. Similar recommendations were made by the group of Chief Justices and other 
high ranking judges convened by the United Nations Center for International Crime Pre-
vention and Transparency International. See Langseth, supra note 70, at 13. 
 364. This is very important because lawyers are often accused of enabling judicial 
corruption. Justice Oyeyipo stated: 
It is sad to observe that lawyers are invariably involved in cases of Judicial 
Corruption. Judicial corruption can hardly take place without the active partici-
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Another problem highlighted in this paper is judicial independence and 
how best to preserve it. Regrettably, politicians exert considerable influ-
ence over the judiciary and often use their powers to prod judges to con-
sent to their wishes. Honest judges find themselves hobbled by pressures 
from elected officials and party stalwarts and are thus prevented from 
engaging in dispassionate and impartial adjudication. Until judges are 
allowed to function without interference, the judicial process will remain 
an eminently unfair forum for conflict resolution. Politicians and elected 
officials must be encouraged, and if need be, challenged to repress the 
instinct to interfere with the judicial process. Here, I suggested the craft-
ing of new policies and regulations that will grant financial autonomy to 
the judiciary and deprive the executive of the strong leverage it uses to 
manipulate judges. 
Fair trial rights and indeed justice will be secured in the country if Ni-
geria aggressively attacks judicial corruption, appoints only competent 
and upright judges, refrains from interfering with the judiciary and pro-
vides the funds necessary to enable the judiciary to function effectively 
and efficiently. The reform proposals suggested in this paper, if honestly 
and properly implemented, will enable the Nigerian judiciary to recap-
ture its integrity, professionalism and independence. Only then will Ni-
geria have a judiciary that can help citizens realize the true meaning and 
promises of fair trial rights guaranteed by the Constitution.365 
                                                                                                             
pant [sic] of a lawyer in one way or the other. A bad lawyer is always too ready 
to serve as a conduit pipe through which money gets to a corrupt judge. 
Oyeyipo, supra note 8, at 17–18. 
 365. Nigerians share President Obasanjo’s characterization of a dream judiciary in his 
speech to the 1999 All Nigeria Judges’ Conference: “The judiciary of our dream [sic] is 
that which is independent and free from all political, legislative, ethnic or religious pres-
sures and manipulation.”  Obasanjo, supra note 2, at xxxvii. 
